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ATOMISTIC ANTITRUSTt
ROBIN

C. FELDMAN* &

MARK A. LEMLEY**

ABSTRACT

Antitrust is atomistic: deliberately focused on trees, not forests. It
pays attention to the consequences of individual acts alleged to be
anticompetitive.
That focus is misplaced. Companies and markets don't focus on
one particular act to the exclusion of all else. Business strategy emphasizes holistic, integrated planning. And market outcomes aren't
determined by a single act, but by the result of multiple acts by
multiple parties in the overall context of the structure and characteristics of the market.
The atomistic nature of modern antitrust law causes it to miss two
important classes of potential competitive harms. First, the focus on
individual acts, coupled with the preponderance of the evidence
standard for proving a violation, means that antitrust can't effectively deal with what we might call probabilistic competitive harm:
multiple acts, any one of which might or might not harm competition. Second, atomistic antitrust tends to miss synergistic competitive
harm: acts which are lawful when taken individually but which
combine together in an anticompetitive way.
Unfortunately, modern antitrust law has strayed too far down the
atomistic pathway. Courts and agencies too often take a narrow,
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transaction-specific focus to challenged conduct. Instead ofasking "is
the overall behavior of this company reducing competition in the
market," they focus on a particular merger or challenged monopolistic practice in isolation. Courts and agencies need to move beyond
atomistic antitrust and take a more holistic look at the circumstances
and effects of an overall pattern of conduct. Our goal in this Article
is to set out a framework for integrated antitrust, in which individual actions can be understood not just on their own but also as part
of a comprehensive whole. Only by doing so can the legal system both
return antitrust to its roots and bring antitrust into the modern
context of the business decisions that courts must analyze today.
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INTRODUCTION

A fundamental premise of modern antitrust law is that monopoly
itself is not illegal. Monopolies can exist-and charge monopoly
prices-without fear of antitrust liability. Big is not bad if a com·
pany's strength is earned through legitimate competition.' Only
specific anticompetitive acts of monopolization or certain agree·
menta with rivals are forbidden by the antitrust laws. Antitrust
enforcement therefore focuses its primary attention on particular
acts claimed to be unlawful, albeit in the context of market power
or other competitive harm. And consistent with the normal rules of
evidence and procedure, showing an antitrust violation generally
requires proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the par·
ticular challenged act harmed competition. 2 And it has become even
harder to meet that burden in recent years as courts imposed new,
antitrust-specific barriers and burdens of proof in an effort to reduce
the risk of false positives. Antitrust, in short, is atomistic: deliber·
ately focused on trees, not forests.
That focus is misplaced. Companies and markets don't focus on
one particular act to the exclusion of all else. Business strategy em·
phasizes holistic, integrated planning. 8 And market outcomes aren't
1. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1920); United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc.,
555 U.S. 438, 447-448 (2009); see also Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades
of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2008).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Microaoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 44, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Tbere
is a limited exception for agreements deemed illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., infra note 80; N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1958) (finding
that overt tying arrangements that j'foreclose competitors from any substantial market'' are
treated as illegal per se (quoting Int1 Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)));
Marc G. Schildkraut, Actavis and the Burden of Proof: Antitrust Revolution, a Muddle, or
Both, ANTiTRUST, Spring 2019, at 56-57.
3. See, e.g., Sandra Filipa Moreira Fernandes, Amelia Maria Pinto da Cunha Brandio
& Carlos Henrique Figueiredo e Melo de Brito, Business Plan: In or Out? A Holistic Vww of
the Combination of Planning and Learning Processes When Evaluating Business Opportunities, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP: DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES AND EMPIRICALAPPRoACH 377,
382-83 (Ladislav Mura ed., 2018); Larry Smith, Joseph C. Andraski & Stanley E. Fawcett,
Integrated Business Planning: ARoadmap to Linking S&OPand CPFR, J. Bus. FORECASTING,
Winter 2010/2011, at 6, 9; Char Newell, The Blueprint for Corporate Health: A Holistic
Approach, FORBES (June 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https:/lwww.forbes.com/siteslforbes
humanresourcescouncil/2018/06/27/the-blueprint-for-corporate-health-a-holistic-approach/
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determined by a single act, but by the result of multiple acts by
multiple parties in the overall context of the structure and characteristics of the market.
The atomistic nature of modern antitrust law causes it to miss
two important classes of potential competitive harms. First, the
focus on individual acts, coupled with the preponderance of the
evidence standard for proving a violation, means that antitrust can't
effectively deal with what we might call probabilistic competitive
harm: multiple acts, any one of which might or might not harm
competition. A monopolist might, for instance, buy a startup that
could potentially turn into a competitor. At the time of the merger,
there is no way to know for sure whether the startup would have
matured into a competitive threat. And the probability that any particular startup would have displaced the monopolist might be
small-say 10 percent. Atomistic antitrust says there is no violation
here because that particular merger is not more likely than not to
restrict competition.' But statistically, a monopolist that buys one
hundred such startups has almost certainly restrained competition,
even though antitrust treats no one purchase as illegal and even
though we don't know which startups would have succeeded.
Second, atomistic antitrust tends to miss synergistic competitive
harm: acts that are lawful when taken individually but combine to
produce anticompetitive effects. A pharmaceutical company, for instance, might take many acts to delay generic competition-from
filing lawsuits, to acquiring follow-on patents, to filing citizen
petitions at the FDA, to denying generic companies access to samples ofthe drug, to repeatedly changing the formulation of the drug.
Some of these acts might themselves be unlawful, but often the law
views them, in isolation, as permitted, even constitutionally
protected, activity. 5 But in the context of pharmaceutical regulation,
they work together to prevent competition that would otherwise
have occurred, not because of a genuine effort to persuade the

[https://perma.cc/D3IT-BL83].
4. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.
5. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87
TEX. L. REV. 685, 686-88 (2009).
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government or the courts, but because of the combined effect of multiple obstacles to generic competition. 6
Synergistic effects also can arise from the interactions of multiple
markets. Patent aggregators that amass vast portfolios can force
rational companies to pay for a license simply by the threat of the
combined power of the portfolio.' The aggregator may not hold
sufficient patents in a traditional product market to constitute a
monopoly. Rather, the aggregator's power comes from the synergistic effects of lower levels of power in multiple intellectual property
(IP) markets. An atomistic lens cannot capture these types of
effects.
Unfortunately, modern antitrust law has strayed too far down the
atomistic pathway. Courts and agencies too often take a narrow,
transaction-specific focus to challenged conduct. Instead of asking
"is the overall behavior of this company reducing competition in the
market,'' they focus on a particular merger or challenged monopolistic practice in isolation. They also create rules of thumb that allow
them to turn away antitrust cases early on. Those rules of thumb
are easier to administer, and they provide a sense of comfort for
companies. The problem is not that everything involved in a particular rule of thumb is wrong or that the notion of developing a
proxy itself is wrong; the danger lies in allowing the proxy to take
on a life of its own, disembodied from the underlying concepts. 8
Modern antitrust law has reached that dangerous domain.
Courts and agencies need to move beyond atomistic antitrust and
take a more holistic look at the circumstances and effects of an overall pattern of conduct. Doing so doesn't require new legislation.
Existing antitrust doctrine permits a broader focus, and indeed that
was part of the original purpose of antitrust law. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, for instance, allows the government to stop monopoly

6. See id. at 687.
7. For a discussion of how patent aggregators impact markets, see infra notes 208-12
and accompanying text.
8. Cf. Robin Feldman, Coming ofAge for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAa 2D 27, 32-33
(discussing the concept in the context of the Federal Circuit's rules on patentable subject
matter); Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin Feldman and the U.C. Hastings Institute for
Innovation Law on Behalf of Neither Party at 19-22, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S.
208 (2014) (No. 13-298).
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"in its incipiency''" by blocking mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'"
That is rather less than a requirement that a plaintiff prove a
merger will create or preserve a monopoly. Similarly, the law on the
books permits the aggregation of conduct by monopolists accused of
an overall scheme to monopolize." Courts just haven't been
enforcing that law. And because antitrust rules are almost entirely
created by courts, courts have the power to change those rules to
better protect competition.
Our goal in this Article is to set out a framework for integrated
antitrust in which individual actions can be understood not just on
their own but also as part of a comprehensive whole. Only by doing
so can the legal system both return antitrust to its roots and bring
antitrust into the modern context of the business decisions that
courts must analyze today. It is a rare moment in legal theory when
one can accomplish both at the same time.
In Part I, we show how antitrust law over the last fifty years has
become increasingly atomistic, trading a broad focus on the structure of markets for a narrow approach anchored in atomistic ends.
In Part II, we argue that this atomistic focus misses important
modern harms to competition, including those related to large tech
companies buying startups, employers imposing noncompete
clauses, pharmaceutical company behaviors blocking generics, and
patent aggregators asserting large portfolios. Finally, in Part III, we
argue for a return to an integrated analysis, one that focuses on
competitive effects as a whole.
We also set out a framework for specific improvements-ranging
from more comprehensive reforms requiring congressional action to
more narrow reforms appropriate for judicial implementation-that
could help avoid the shortsightedness of atomistic antitrust. Among
other things, we suggest creating a presumption of anticompetitive
harm from mergers by monopolists, allowing antitrust law to punish
9. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added).
11. See Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir.1992) ("[l]t would not
be proper to focus on specific individual acts of an accused monopolist while refusing to
consider their overall combined effect."); see also Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698-99 (1962) (considering the aggregation of defendant's actions as opposed to viewing each act independently).

1876

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1869

a pattern of conduct that harms competition even if no one act in
that pattern is itself provably anticompetitive, and encouraging
courts that do find an antitrust violation to impose remedies sufficient to undo the competitive harm rather than just limiting themselves to stopping an ongoing violation. More important than the
particular solutions, however, is replacing today's atomistic antitrust with a broader focus.
I. ANTITRUST'S FOCUS ON THE TREES

Antitrust law was conceived broadly, as the "Magna Carta offree
enterprise." 12 When the first antitrust law, the Sherman Antitrust
Act, was passed in 1890, it condemned two basic types of conductmonopolization (an effort by a dominant firm to acquire or maintain
control of a market) and cartels (agreements among competitors to
fix prices or otherwise restrict competition). 13 The statutes are
written in sweeping fashion to cover a wide variety of conduct that
threatens competition.
Despite the breadth of the statutes, antitrust law has become
increasingly atomistic. Over the last fifty years in particular, anumber of procedural rules and substantive doctrines have pushed
antitrust into narrow corners, leaving it ill-equipped to manage a
comprehensive analysis of competitive effects as a whole. In this
Part, we discuss a range of these doctrines.
A. Standards of Proof

Antitrust law requires plaintiffs to prove causation and injury
with more detail and particularity than other bodies of law. 14 That
is particularly important because integral aspects of antitrust law
rely much more on predictions of future harm than other areas of
law. 15 Most law is backward-looking, asking whether a defendant
12. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
13. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S. C.
§§ 1-2).
14. See Hanns A. Abele, Georg E. Kodek & Guido K Schaefer, Proving Causation in
Private Antitrust Cases, 7 J. COMPETITIONL. & ECON. 847, 847-48 (2011).

15. See Herbert J. Hovenka.m.p, Antitrust Harm and Causation 2 (Jan. 31, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarship.law.upenn..edu/faculty_scholarship/2257/ [https:l/
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breached a contract, committed a tort, infringed a patent, and the
like. At most, remedies may require some effort to predict the future.16 But important parts of antitrust law-in many ways the most
important parts-are designed not to identify past illegal acts but
to prevent future ones. Assessing a merger, a regulatory filing, a
change in prices, or an exclusive dealing arrangement requires
courts to compare what would happen with and without the conduct
in question. 17 Indeed, the very definition of markets and market
power that is at the heart of most antitrust cases requires predictions about both how consumers will behave in response to a small
but significant nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP) and whether
potential competitors will enter the market in response to the defendant's behavior.'"
Law as a whole struggles with these predictive tasks. Courts are
most comfortable looking backwards to precedent. They are hesitant
to change the operation of the market by relying on their predictions
of what will happen rather than waiting to see what actually
happens. 19 But sometimes they have no choice, as when a tort suit
alleges that a particular chemical increases the plaintiff's risk of
cancer. 20
The ordinary rules of evidence and procedure make it hard for
plaintiffs to win a case based on prediction. A plaintiff must
generally show that it is "more likely than not'' that the defendant
injured it. 21 That can be hard to do when the real answer is "maybe,
but no one knows for sure."22 But it is even harder in antitrust
perma.cc/KT49-ANY2].

16. See, e.g., Workman v. United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (S.D.

W.Va. 2000).
17. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 236 (D.D.C. 2017).
18. But see Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303,
1320 (2017) (arguing market power should not be the focus).
19. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REv.

71, 90-95 (2020) (discussing examples of incorrect predictions from copyright law on how new
technologies would affect various markets).
20. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
21. See generally John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard
of Ciuil Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569 (2015) (discussing the histary of the "preponderance of the

evidence" standard).
22. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25 (denying class certification in an asbestos
exposure case in part because of the wide variety of exposures and injuries, particularly
among "exposure-only plaintiffs''). See generally Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into
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cases. The Supreme Court has set up special procedural hurdles
that weed out cases with uncertain harm not just at trial, but on
summary judgment or even on a motion to dismiss. 23 It is even
harder at that early procedural stage to develop the evidence that
might give a court confidence in making a prediction about the
effects of defendant's alleged conduct. And that is particularly true
because, as Christopher Leslie has shown, courts treat circumstantial evidence with more and more disdain in antitrust cases. 24
Those rules combine with other special procedural doctrines that
make effective antitrust challenges unlikely. Antitrust plaintiffs
must pass a tougher standing hurdle than almost any other type of
federal court plaintiff, 25 demonstrating not just injury but "antitrust
injury'': ''injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful."26 Many plaintiffs injured by an antitrust violation are
excluded because they aren't the right type of plaintiffs. 27 Moreover,
showing antitrust injury generally requires evidence of a past
injury, but many anticompetitive harms are not felt until well after
the anticompetitive conduct. Even plaintiffs who do suffer the right
sort of injury are excluded from relief unless they purchased goods
directly from the defendant. 28 And those direct purchasers who do
Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 237 (2013); Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to
the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986)
(reversing grant of summary judgment to petitioners due to evidentiary defects); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (balding that stating a valid claim of anticompetitive conduct under section 1 of the Sherman Act "requires a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made'').
24. Christopher R. Leslie, The Decline and Fall of Circumstantial Evidence in Antitrust
Law, 69 AM. U. L. REv. 1713, 1714-16 (2020).
26. The one possible exception exists in the "next friend" standing principle on which most
habeas corpus petitions rely. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990) (outlining the
requirements needed to find next friend standing); see 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 7 (2021).
26. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
27. For discussions of antitrust injury doctrine, see generally Ronald W. Davis, Standing
on Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697
(2003); Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down
the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 (1998).
28. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Note that most state antitrust
statutes reject this limitation. See Jonathan T. Tomlin & Dale J. Giali, Federalism and the
Indirect Purchaser M£ss, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 161 (2002).

2022]

ATOMISTIC ANTITRUST

1879

qualify under both the antitrust injury and Illinois Brick doctrines
are frequently subject to arbitration clauses that forbid them from
bringing antitrust claims in federal court, arbitrating as a class, or
obtaining the remedies antitrust law mandates. 29

B. Mergers and Future Harm
The original Sherman Act prohibited monopolization and agree·
ments to restrict competition, but it didn't expressly prevent
merging with competitors.•• Businesses that were accustomed to
operating in interlocking "trusts" responded by merging their sepa·
rate companies into a single firm, avoiding the harsher punishment
the law afforded cartels. 81 Indeed, the two decades after the passage
of the Sherman Act led to the largest number of mergers in U.S.
history."2
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act in an effort to stop
these efforts to evade the reach of the Sherman Act."3 While the
Sherman Act focused on stopping existing anticompetitive practices,
the Clayton Act was more forward-looking, aiming to prevent mergers and other conduct that might create a monopoly or establish the
conditions for a successful cartel. 34 It targeted not just behavior by
monopolists but conduct that "may ... substantially ... lessen
competition, or ... tend to create a monopoly." 35 And the stated
purpose of the statute was to stop threats to competition "in their
incipiency,''"" precluding mergers or exclusive dealing arrangements
that might unduly concentrate markets even though those markets
were currently competitive."7
29. See generally Mark A Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and
lllinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2115 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie,
Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2015).
30. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
u.s.c. §§ 1-2).
31. See George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J .L.
& ECON. 77, 98-106 (1985).
32. See id. at 111 (discussing the trend).
33. See V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1931).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
35. ld.
36. S. REP. No. 63-698, at 1 (1914); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346
(1962).
37. See Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the
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For many years, the courts and antitrust agencies used this
power to target not just mergers to monopoly or misbehavior by
monopolists but potentially anticompetitive conduct even in relatively unconcentrated markets. 88 But a large part of the Chicago
School antitrust movement beginning in the 1970s was designed to
make it harder to prove antitrust cases, and the incipiency standard
was a particular target. 89 The Chicago revolution has been successful-so successful, in fact, that it is now virtually impossible to
make out an antitrust claim based on the possibility of future harm
to competition or the risk that a market will grow too concentrated.40
Substantive antitrust rules, too, set higher hurdles for plaintiffs
predicting the future than for their non-antitrust counterparts.
Plaintiffs alleging attempted monopolization, for instance, need to
show not only that the defendant attempted to monopolize and took
steps to further that goal but that the attempt had a "dangerous
probability" of succeeding. 41 That is a requirement absent from
attempt cases outside antitrust, even criminal cases. 42 Plaintiffs
alleging a conspiracy to monopolize must show that each defendant
deliberately chose to conspire with all others, 43 a requirement
Importance of "Redundant" Competitors, 2018 WJB. L. REv. 783, 792-93.
38. See Robert H. McGuckin, Merger Enforcement· Out of the Courtroom After 75 Years,
35 ANTITRUST BULL. 677, 681 (1990) (discussing how antitrust enforcers and courts would stop
"almost any merger where an argument could be made that a competitor might be hurt'' after

the passage of Cellar-Kefauver amendment to the Clayton Act in 1950).
39. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 76

COLUM. L. REV. 282, 304 (1976) ("'n Brown Shoe, as in Columbia Steel, one has no sense that
the Court has any notion of how a non.m.onopolistic merger might affect competition.'); see also
William MacLeod, The Relevant Product Market after Brown Shoe: A Framework of Analysis
for Clayton and Sherman Act Coses, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (1981); John L. Peterman, The
Brown Shoe Cose, 18 J.L. & ECON. 81 (1975).
40. See Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Did Robert Bork
Understate the Competitive Impact ofMergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 67 J.L.
& ECON. 867 (2014) (showing that mergers short of monopoly raise consumer prices).
41. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); see Christopher R.
Leslie, Hindsight Bias in Antitrust Law, 71 VAND. L. REv. 1527, 1540-55 (2018) (showing how
courts mishandle the "dangerous probability" inquiry).

42. See John C. Bjorkman, Comment, Attempt to Monopolize: Dangerous Probability of
Success as an Obstacle to Enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 6 U. PuGET SoUND L. REv.
289 (1982) (comparing attempt to monopolize with attempt in criminal law).
43. See Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1987) (requiring
evidence of interdependence to infer an overarching conspiracy from a series of bilateral

2022]

ATOMISTIC ANTITRUST

1881

absent from criminal conspiracy cases, which require only a
commitment to the common enterprise. 44 Proof of predatory pricing
requires not just proof that it happened, but that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the predatory strategy will pay off for the defendant in the long run. 45 And the very requirement that defendants be
shown to dominate an existing market effectively forecloses the
possibility of showing harm to future markets.••
Nowhere is modern antitrust's resistance to predictions of harm
more evident than in merger law, the very place where the incipiency standard was supposed to open it up. The point of a merger
challenge is predictive. Unlike an antitrust case based on monopolization or a cartel, in which the government can point to existing
anticompetitive conduct, a merger challenge is necessarily a judgment about likely future effects. And the statute was written to
allow the government to block mergers that may lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly, an explicit recognition of that uncertainty.
agreements). A complaint for conspiracy ''must allege that each individual defendant joined
the conspiracy and played some role in it because, at the heart of an antitrust conspiracy is
an agreement and a conscious decision by each defendant to join it." In re Capacitors Antitrust
Litig., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (qU<>tiug In re TFr·LCD (Flat Panel)
Antitrust Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2008)). Every defendant must be
specifically connected to the alleged conspiracy. See, e.g., Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 446 F.
Supp. 3d 578, 593 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1136-37 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss where the complaint
contained no allegations "specifically connecting" them to the alleged conspiracy). Full
disclosure: one of us (Lemley) represents the plaintiffs in Staley.
44. See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944) ("It is true that a
party to a conspiracy need not know the identity, or even the number, of his confederates;
when he embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its
content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them.").
45. See Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) C'For
recoupment to occur, below-cost pricing must be capable, as a threshold matter, of producing
the intended effects on the firm's rivals."). Compare PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, Monopolization: Particular Exclusionary Practices, in FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 7·89 to 7·90 (4th ed. 2011) (supporting this rule), with Christopher R. Leslie,
Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 1695 (2013) (critiquing the same).
46. In the 1990s, the antitrust agencies tried to deal with this problem by developing the
concepts of innovation and technology markets. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JusT. & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTiTRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4-5, 8-11
(1995). But those concepts have not been put to significant use by the courts in the last
twenty-five years. See Richard.J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust
Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1940·42 (2015).
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Nonetheless, modern merger cases require the same standard of
proof as in any other civil case: the plaintiff must prove it is more
likely than not that the merger will harm competition. 47 The district
court in United States v. AT&T Inc. wrote:
By using "the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition"'
in Section 7, Congress indicated ''that its concern was with
probabilities, not certainties." Although certainty of harm is not
necessary to prove a Section 7 violation, neither is the "mere
possibility'' of harm sufficient. Rather, to grant injunctive relief
under the Clayton Act, the Court must conclude that the Government has introduced evidence sufficient to show that the
challenged "transaction is likely to lessen competition substantially." As part of satisfying that burden, Section 7 "demand[s]
that a plaintiff demonstrate that the substantial lessening of
competition will be 'sufficiently probable and imminent' to warrant relief."48

The court (and the court of appeals) rejected the government's challenge to AT&T's purchase of Time Warner under this standard,
crediting the merging parties' claims about how the merged company would behave. 49 Despite its promises, the merged company
started restricting competition almost immediately after the merger
was approved.'" Other examples include the court's rejection of the
47. Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HAsTINGS L.J. 45, 48-50 (2018)

("Today, most mergers are challenged before they occur. As a result, the feared post-merger
conduct has not occurred either and ... [the] evidence [pertains to] predicted rather than
actual effects. This ... makes it important to place some limits on merger law's prophylactic
reach. First, the language of section 7 requires causation ... [which] requires a showing that
the merger is what is likely to facilitate the feared anticompetitive conduct. Second, we need
to be satisfied that this conduct, if it should occur, will be both anticompetitive and d.iffi.cult
to reach through direct application of the antitrust laws. Third, the merger must raise a
significant risk that the conduct will occur.... Finally, as with all merger cases, there must not
be offsetting gains that serve to justify the merger notwithstanding these threats to competition.... [T]he assumption that many mergers produce efiJ.ciencies is built into our prima
facie case to begin with. As a result, we do not want to condemn a merger based on mere
speculation that it might lead to some anticompetitive outcome." (footnotes omitted)).

48. 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 189-90 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(citations omitted).

49. See id. at 182-83, 219.

50. See David Dayen, The AT&T-Time Warner Merger Is Already What the Government
Feared, NEW REPUBLIC (June 22, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149305/atttim.e-

warner-merger-already-govemment-feared [https:llperma.cciFI'M7 -CS2H].
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government's challenge to the Oracle-PeopleSoft merger, which led
to some of the very consequences the government predicted. 51
The requirement that the government prove that the defendant's
conduct will more likely than not cause imminent harm is not
limited to merger cases. Courts impose strict causation requirements in other antitrust cases, too. The most notorious example is
Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, in which the D.C. Circuit reversed a finding
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the grounds that the
agency had not proven that Rambus's anticompetitive conduct
caused a particular identified harm. 52 The FTC had shown that but
for Rambus's deception of a standard-setting organization, the organization would have taken one of two different actions, either of
which would have been better for competition than giving Ram bus
an unfettered monopoly, but that it could not prove which one would
have happened. 53 The D.C. Circuit held that, because the FTC
couldn't prove with certainty which of the alternative scenarios
would have happened, the entire case had to be thrown out for
failure to show that Rambus's conduct caused a particular anticompetitive harm. 54 Other causation cases have permitted anticompetitive conduct by pharmaceutical patent owners because the
plaintiffs could not prove that generic companies would have been
ready, willing, and able to enter the market if that conduct hadn't
happened. 55
51. See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Csl. 2004); see also
David Bank,.After 18-MonthBattle, Oracle Finally Wins over PeopleSoft, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14,
2004, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110293586982698273 [https://perma.cc/
VS2L-YT9H].

52. See 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For a critique of the decision, see Michael A
Carrier, The D.C. Circuit's Excessively High Causation Standard in Rambus 12-24 (Apr. 8,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1586430 [https:l/perma.cc/EW9UR2WM].
53. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466-67.
54. See id. at 459.
55. See, e.g.,AndrxPharms., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 179,186 (D.D.C. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) ("The primary injury alleged here by Biovail---delay in sales-is speculative

because there is no evidence that absent the Andrx-HMRI agreement, Biovail would be
marketing its generic drug."); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 165 (3d Cir.
2017); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 63 (1st Cir. 2017); see also
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T]he courts have held that
a potential competitor cannot achieve standing merely by demonstrating his intention to enter
a field; he must also demonstrate his preparedness to do so." (emphasis added)).
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C. Petitioning Agencies and Courts
Incumbents regularly use legal rules and lawsuits to try to
prevent disruptive competition. 56 But plaintiffs face particular challenges in alleging that a defendant restrained competition by filing
lawsuits or regulatory challenges to try to interfere with a competitor's business.
The difficulties begin with a series of Supreme Court cases from
the 1960s and 1970s expounding on the notion that citizens have
rights under the First Amendment to petition the government for
the redress of grievances. 57 Known collectively as the NoerrPennington doctrine, the cases operate to curtail antitrust law,
motivated by a concern that the threat of antitrust damages might
cast a pall over First Amendment liberties. 58 As the Justices noted
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., the first in the series of cases:
[A] representative democracy such as this ... depends upon the
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government retains the power to act
in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time,
that the people cannot freely inform the government of their
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate,
not business activity, but political activity. 59

56. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19.
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.").
58. Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment & Patents: The Fraud Fallacy, 17
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 30, 47-67 (2015) (describing in-depth the history of the NoerrPennington doctrine and its application in the context of patent law, as well as historical and
modern views of federalism and its impact in litigation and preemption); see also Robin

Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 250, 301-02 (2013) [herein·
after Feldmsn,lntellectual Property Wrongs] (discossing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
59. 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) (holdiog that publicity csmpaign by tweoty-four railroads
aimed at ensuring adoption of favorable legislation did not violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
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Thus, the Supreme Court seemed to view a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims as potentially more problematic than an individual
suit. 60
But the Court still focused on baseless suits. What if a pattern of
lawsuits or agency petitions is filed in order to harass a competitor
but not all those suits are baseless? In those circumstances, some
courts have looked at behavior as a whole. These decisions have
found that, when dealing with a series oflawsuits or administrative
actions, the entire set of activities may constitute sham behavior
even if some individual filings are ultimately successful and there·
fore not objectively baseless. 61 For example, the Ninth Circuit in
USS-POSCO Industries v. Contra Costa County Building &
Construction Trades Council explained the following:
When dealing with a series of lawsuits, the question is not
whether any one of them has merit-some may turn out to, just
as a matter of chance--but whether they are brought pursuant
to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the
merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival. 62

60. See, e.g., In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 828 (N.D.

lll. 2020) ("[A]ntitrust liability has long attached wherever there was a 'pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims' that shows the 'administrative and judicial processes have been abused.'"
(quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972))); Pro. Real

Estate Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 58 (1993) C'Notbing in California

Motor Transport retreated from these principles ... we recognized that recourse to agencies
and courts should not be condemned as sham until a reviewing court has 'discern[ed] and
draw[n]' the 'difficult line' separating objectively reasonable claims from 'a pattern ofbaseless,
repetitive claims ... which leads the factfinderto conclude that the administrative and judicial
processes have been abused.'" (quoting Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513)); Venda Co. v.

Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 644-45 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) Guxtaposing a

"genuine attempt[] to use the ... adjudicative process legitimately" against a ''pattern of baseless, repetitive claims''); see also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380
(1973) (citing Cal. Motor Trcmsp., 404 U.S. at 513) (describing sham litigation as "evidenced
by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims" (emphasis added)).
61. See, e.g., Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 182-83

(3d Cir. 2015); Waugh ChapelS., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728
F.3d 354, 365 (4th Cir. 2013); Pri.metime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat1 Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92,
101-02 (2d Cir. 2000); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. ffidg. & Constr. Trades
Cauncil, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994).
62. 31 F.3d at 811.
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In the memorable words of the court, "even a broken clock is right
twice a day ." 63
The Second Circuit followed similar logic in Primetime 24 Joint
Venture v. National Broadcasting Co., which involved a series of
challenges by the major television networks against a satellite
operator under the Satellite Home Viewer Act related to signal
strength. 64 The court found that the behavior was brought "without
regard to the merits," and therefore the major television networks
could not claim Noerr immunity from antitrust. 65 In the same vein,
a Louisiana district court in Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n v.
Jefferson Downs Corp. rejected what it called a "sequential analysis"
for a group oflawsuits. 56 The court held that ''the pertinent question
is not whether any one of the lawsuits has merit,'' but rather
whether the entire enterprise followed "a policy of instituting legal
proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of
injuring a market rival."67 The FTC has also adopted this posture in
bringing enforcement actions against pharmaceutical companies
related to patterns of activities that block potential rivals. 68
In contrast, district courts in New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, and
Ohio have ignored or declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's lead. 69
63. ld.; see also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor
Unions for Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 767, 789-97 (1992).

64. 219 F.3d at 95, 101.
65. See id. at 101 (finding that the lower court erred in granting the major television
networks' motion to dismiss because the satellite operator adequately alleged that the networks' coordinated challenges were brought without regard to the merits and for the purpose

of injuring a competitor, and thus not protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
66. 192 F. Supp. 2d 619, 637 (M.D. La. 2001).
67. Id. at 538 (citing Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
49, 58 (1993)).

68. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003) (consent decree related
to an action alleging pattern of anticompetitive practices to delay generic entry); FTC v.
Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 162, 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (FTC action against Shire
Pharmaceutical related to filing of forty-three citizen petitions dismissed on grounds that the
behavior had ceased).
69. See Christian Mem'l Cultural Ctr., Inc. v. Mich. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 998 F. Supp. 772,
777 & n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (acknowledging but declining to follow the Ninth Circuit); Re/Max
Int1 v. Realty One, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 132, 160-61 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (applying Professional
Real Estate without mentioning the Ninth Circuit approach distinguishing between single
action and pattern cases), aff'd, 173 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999); see also In re Hu.mira
(Adalimumab) Autitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (dodging the issue
by noting that "[e]ven in circuits that apply the type of more flexible test plaintiffs say should
be applied here, a batting average of .534 would be too high to plausibly allege sham
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These courts have concluded that each action in a series must be
evaluated separately and each must be found objectively baseless. 70
Even when courts consider the group of actions as a whole, they
tend to focus on percentages, as if one can divine the answer by
identifying a magic number. An example of the percentage approach
appears in the district court of Illinois' 2020 In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litigation decision. 71 Plaintiffs alleged a variety of activities related to the blockbuster rheumatoid-arthritis
drug, Humira. 72 As part of that claim, the court considered the
company's patenting behavior. 78 Ducking the question of whether to
follow the more flexible approach when a plaintiff files multiple
petitions, the Humira court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy either standard. 74 Specifically, the court noted that the
petitioning as a matter of law"). One can understand the hesitation of some courts to follow
the Ninth Circuit's formulation. The Supreme Court's decision in Professional Real Estate
emphasized both objective and subjective analysis. 508 U.S. at 58-59. The Ninth Circuit's test
arguably blurs the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in framing the question as
whether the activities were brought "pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without
regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival." USS-POSCO Indus. v.
Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d BOO, 811 (9th Cir. 1994).
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's language is not the only possible approach. Lower courts
could establish a formulation that hews more closely to the Supreme Court's desire for
objectivity, despite the fact that the desire was expressed in a case related to a single action.
The Supreme Court could also clarify that different tests apply to pattern cases and single
action cases, such as Professional Real Estate. See 508 U.S. at 58-59 (establishing that for a
single lawsuit to constitute sham behavior, the behavior must be both objectively and subjectively baseless). Patterns of behavior need to be considered as a whole, rather than in
atomistic fashion.
70. See Christian Mem 1 Cultural Ctr., 998 F. Supp. at 777-78; RefMax Int1, 900 F. Supp.
at 160-61. Of course, some filings can succeed and still be objectively baseless. Consider
petitions filed with the FDA urging it to deny approval of a generic drug. Brand companies
have filed these so-called citizen petitions demanding, among other things, that the agency
require of a generic company what is already required of generic companies under agency
rules. The filing delays the generic's approval for months. The request has no merit-in that
it was unnecessary-yet the agency technically must approve that portion of the petition.
Citizen petitions, however, are likely to be an outlying case rather than the rule, given the
idiosyncratic nature of the process. See generally Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both,
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2014); Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions:
An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249 (2012); Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti,
Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Lost Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305 (2016).
71. See 465 F. Supp. 3d at 830.
72. ld. at 819.
73. See id. at 819, 830.
74. Id.
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company filed a total of 24 7 patent applications and obtained 132
patents-with 90 percent of them issuing more than twelve years
after the drug was first marketed. 76 The court described this "bat·
ting average of .534" as too high to allege sham petitioning.'" In
support of its conclusion, the court listed the percentages of suc·
cessful petitions in other pattern of petition cases, 77 as if merely
counting up the number of petitions that were approved versus the
number that failed could provide a concrete answer to the question
of whether the behavior as a whole constitutes a sham. Although
the counting approach may reflect an effort to look for something
supposedly objective, it entirely misses the point of synergistic
behavior. One cannot understand the power of a symphony by
counting the notes. 78
The effect of Noerr-Pennington is that it is very hard to win an
antitrust case where the anticompetitive conduct is the filing of
lawsuits or regulatory challenges.'" While some courts are willing
to consider a pattern oflawsuits to present a greater problem, many
others aren't.
75. Id. at 822.
76. Id. at 822, 830-31.
77. Id. at 830-31 (citing Waugh ChapelS., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union
Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354, 365 (4th Cir. 2013)) (success rate of 7 percent, one in fourteen "suggests
a sham"); Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Lab'ys, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046-47 (9th
Cir. 2009) (success rate of 41 percent, seven out of seventeen lawsuits and where the company
had plausible arguments in the remaining ten= no sham); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra
Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994) (success rate of
62 percent, fifteen in twenty-nine lawsuits= no sham); Twin City Bakery Workers & Welfare
Fund v. AstraAktieholag, 207 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (infringement claims for
four of six asserted patents proceeded beyond summary judgment and two of the four
proceeded through trial = no sham). In applying this logic, the district court in Humira
followed a Seventh Circuit case, outside of the pharmaceutical arena, concluding that in
examining Noerr immunity, one should first separate immunized from nonimmunized
conduct. See In re Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 828 (citing Mercatus Grp. LLC v. Lake Forest
Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2011)).
78. For criticism of Humira, see Ryan Knox & Gregory Curfman, The Humira Patent
Thicket and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 9-15, 18-20 (Feb. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=3781826 [https://perma.cc/L3FV-8SNP]; Michael A
Carrier, The US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Dismisses Antitrust Case
Challenging Patent Thicket (Humira), E·COMPETITIONS, June 2020, at 5-6.
79. See 1 HERBERTHOVENKAMP,MARKD.JANis,MARKA. LEMLEY, CIIIUSTOPHERR.LESLIE
& MICHAEL A CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO INTELLECTUAL PRoPERTY LAW§ 11.2b (3d ed. 2020) (noting that sham litigation challenges
overwhelmingly fail).
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D. Market or Markets?
Outside of a narrow group of behaviors deemed illegal per se
under antitrust law, every form of antitrust analysis begins with
proof that the party accused of engaging in anticompetitive activity
holds or will obtain power in the relevant market. 80 Market power
serves as a proxy for ensuring that a firm can raise prices and limit
supply, thereby creating the type of harm that antitrust law recognizes. 81 And proving market power usually requires a fairly elaborate effort to define "the market" (both product and geographic) in
which the anticompetitive conduct occurs. 82
In the context of anticompetitive behavior involving IP, modern competition authorities examine three types of markets. 83 The
first two coincide with more traditional views of markets-specifically, the market for the relevant good or service and the market
for the IP rights in that good or service. 84 In addition to these two
markets, competition authorities have on occasion paid attention
80. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hasp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) ("The
rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market
conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to

render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves
anticompetitive conduct."); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 467 U.S. 332, 3464 7 (1982) (holding that horizontal and fixed maximum prices fall within the per se rule
against price-fixing agreements).
81. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HAsTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003).
82. For a persuasive argument that that effort is fruitless, see Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever)
Define Markets?, 1241IARv. L. REV. 437 (2010). A federal court dismissed the FTC's antitrust
complaint against Facebook, in part, on the grounds that the FTC did not plead facts specific
enough to establish that Facebook has market dominance. The court even recognized the
difficulty of calculating market power in the market for personal social media. It used this
cli:lireulty to justify imposing a higher standard. for alleging market dominance in this hard-todefine market than in markets for ordinary goods. In this way, the challenge of distilling
certain markets' conditions into concrete measurements of "market power'' has, ironically,
compelled judges to raise the bar even higher to take on powerful incumbents. FTC v.
Facebook, Inc., No. CV 20-3590, 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021). The FTC was
ultimately able to successfully meet this higher standard and plead market power, however,
in part because it had been very artful in defining the market in the first place. FI'C v.
Facebook, Inc., No. CV 20-3590, 2022 WL 103308, at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022).
83. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PRoPERTY 7-13 (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LICENSING GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov/sitesldefault/flles/atrllegacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf [https:/1
perma.cc/K9BJ-9T59].
84. See id.
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to companies that do not directly compete but might do so in the
future: so-called nascent competitors. 85 The government prevailed
on such a claim in its 1990s case against Microsoft for the company's attempts to squash competition in the computer browser
market in order to protect its operating system monopoly. 86
But the concept of nascency is broader than just new competitors.
Companies may also contest new or evolving markets. Markets, too,
can be nascent. The law should prevent monopolists from eliminating competition from an emerging technology or a splinter market
before the new market develops in a way that could threaten a
monopoly stronghold. 87 As the court noted in Microsoft, ''it would be
inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free
reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will." 88
But anticompetitive conduct doesn't always map to an antitrust
market. In part, that's because market definition is arbitrary, as
Louis Kaplow has argued. 89 In part it is because, as we describe
below, conduct by defendants such as patent aggregators can affect
competition even when the relevant actor lacks power in the
products, services, or IP rights in a single relevant market. 90 In
those cases, the hunt for power in any of these three types of
markets-products or services, IP, and nascent markets-would be
in vain.
85. See C. ScottHemphill&Tim Wu,N(Jilcent Competitors, 168U.PA.L.REv.1879(2020);
A. Douglas Melamed, Acquisitions of Nascent Competitors Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, CONCURRENTIALISTE (Feb. 8, 2021), https:l/leconcurrentialiste.com/melamed-nascentcompetitors [https://perma.cc/W6GY-W29M]; Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit
Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 94-99 (2021).
86. See Robin Feldman, Perverse Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers High Drug PricesExcept for Tlwse Who Pay the Bills, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 367 (2020).
87. See id. (using the cradle imagery in discussing the concept).
88. 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001); accord ANTITRUST LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note
83, at 10-11; LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding in a bundled

pricing case that "[w]hen a monopolist's actions are designed to prevent one or more new or
potential competitors from gaining a foothold in the market by exclusionary, i.e. predatory,
conduct, its success in that goal is not only injurious to the potential competitor but also to
competition in general").
89. See Kaplow, supra note 18, at 1392-96, 1400 n.204; Kaplow, supra note 82, at 438-41;
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Merger Analysis 3 (Harv. L. Sch. John. M. Olin Ctr. Discussion
Paper, Paper No. 1049, 2020), https://ssrn.comlabstract=3741660 [https:l/perma.cc/S4D5BMNX].
90. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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The focus on the market to exclude real competitive harm from
antitrust's scope is getting worse as a result of two troubling recent
decisions. In Ohio v. American Express Co., the Supreme Court
made it much more difficult to assert an antitrust claim against
technology platforms, holding that restricting competition in only
one side of a "two-sided" market wasn't illegal. 91 In other words, it
didn't matter whether American Express restrained competition in
the market for providing credit card services to merchants unless it
also restrained competition in the consumer-facing market, and vice
versa. The decision has been roundly criticized by antitrust scholars.92 And in FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., the Ninth Circuit abandoned
decades of precedent to conclude that antitrust law didn't protect
consumers because they, unlike competitors, weren't in the same
market as the defendant. 93 This decision, too, has been criticized. 94
It is exactly the opposite of the point of antitrust, which is precisely
to protect consumers,"• and hopefully it won't survive. But like
AmEx, Qualcomm makes it very difficult to bring any antitrust case
that doesn't fit neatly within an established market box. 96

91. See 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018).
92. E.g., Michael L. Katz & A. Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law:
American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REv. 2061 (2020); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 CoLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 35; Douglas Melamed, The American Express Case: Back to the Future, 18 CoLO.
TECH.L.J.1, 10-14 (2020); JohnM. Newman, The Output-Welfare Fallacy: AModemAntitruet
Paradox, 107 IowA L. REv. 663, 666-68 (2022); Sanjana Parikh, Defining the Market for 'IWoSided Platforms: The &ope of Ohio v. American Express, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1306
(2019); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Ohio v. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms; the Charge Card "Market;" and the Need for Procompetitive Justifications, 70 MERCER
L. REV. 437 (2019).
93. See 969 F. 3d 974, 982, 1005 (9th Cir. 2020).
94. See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 79, § 36.06[b] ('The Ninth Circuit
ignored the district court's detailed factual fmdings on this issue, in part because it wrongly
concluded that competitive harm to downstream purchasers didn't count for antitrust
purposes but also in part because it found that reallocating prices to "squeeze'' competitors
wasn't illegal ... unless Qualcomm charged predatory prices."); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What
Went Wrong and How to Fix It, ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2021, at 40 ("Something is deeply
wrong with antitrust law when the facts show that a monopolist has engaged in conduct that
excludes competitors by raising their costs and harms consumers by raising prices, yet an
appellate court does not see an antitrust violation.").
95. See Hoven.kamp, supra note 92, at 46.
96. See Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d at 1005; Harrison, supra note 92.
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***
Antitrust law was designed to allow integrated analyses that
focus on competitive effects as a whole. Over the last fifty years,
courts and agencies have become fixated on atomistic analyses,
leaving them unable to manage emerging challenges to the competitive landscape.
The result of all of this is that antitrust law imposes significant
obstacles to cases based on predictive harm, obstacles greater than
we see in other areas of law. To be sure, some of those obstacles
exist for good reason. Many of these antitrust doctrines developed
in response to a more permissive-arguably too permissive-prior
era of antitrust law. Courts were right to pull back from doctrines
that viewed companies with a 3 percent market share as posing a
dangerous probability of monopolization, for instance. 97 And people
often file antitrust suits because they are upset at losing a market
competition. It is helpful for courts to have a tool like the antitrust
injury doctrine to weed out implausible theories of anticompetitive
harm."" But the aggregate effect has been to insulate defendants
from liability by requiring plaintiffs to predict the future harmful
effects of defendants' conduct or link together a pattern of behavior
that is not itself provably illegal.
II. THE FOREST ANTITRUST MISSES

Modern antitrust's atomistic focus leads it to ignore two types of
cases where the simple logic of 1 + 1 = 2 doesn't reflect the complexity of the real world. Those lacunae fall into two basic categories:
probabilistic injury (conduct that might or might not turn out to
harm competition) and synergistic injury (conduct that isn't individually anticompetitive but that restricts competition when combined
with other conduct).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966) (rejecting
merger of two grocery companies with less than 5 percent of the local market); cf. Int'l Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (194 7) (finding market power because of a patent
even though International Salt had less than 10 percent of the salt market).
98. Cf. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at 90-94 (suggesting application of an
analogous rule in IP cases); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenka.m.p, IP and Antitrust:

Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010) (same).
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A. Probabilistic Antitrust Harm

The first blind spot of modern antitrust doctrine concerns conduct
that might or might not injure competition in the future. Consistent
with the normal requirement that the plaintiff prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the special additional hurdles
antitrust law has created,"9 antitrust law requires a plaintiff to
show that it is more likely than not that any particular conduct alleged to be anticompetitive caused antitrust injury. 100
While that might seem unobjectionable, it leaves antitrust unable
to effectively deal with defendants who repeatedly engage in a
pattern of actions that individually have a less than 51 percent
chance of directly causing competitive harm. In the scenarios we
describe here, each individual act might or might not harm competition. But take enough acts that each have a 10 percent chance of
harming competition and you are virtually certain to do some harm
to competition. We call this probabilistic antitrust harm. Antitrust
law doesn't have a mechanism for taking probabilistic harm into
account.

1. Mergers
The first scenario that presents probabilistic harm involves
mergers. As noted in Part I, antitrust law evaluates each merger on
its merits, asking whether the challenger can prove that that particular merger will cause harm to competition.
Large companies are actively buying dozens of different companies.101 In the late 1990s, about two hundred VC-backed companies
went public per year on average; in recent years, only about
seventy-five have done so-a more than 60 percent decrease.'02
99. See supra Part I.
100. See United States v. AT & T loc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 189-90 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 916
F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
101. Portions of the next few paragraphs are adapted from Lemley & McCreary, supra note
85, at 8.
102. These averages cover 1995 to 2000 and 2010 to 2015. See NAT'L VENTURE CAP.Ass'N,
YEARBOOK2014, at 14 fig.9.0 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 YEARBOOK] (tallying VC-backed IPOs
from 1985 to 2013); NAT'L VENTURE CAP. AsS'N, YEARBOOK 2016, at 64 fig.4.03 (2016)
[hereinafter 2016YEARBOOK] (same from 1995 to 2015). The trend continues for the following
five years. See, NAT'L VENTURE CAP. Ass'N, YEARBOOK 2021, at 37 (2021) [hereinafter 2021
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This decline is especially striking given that the number of VCbacked firms exiting has increased during this period, from about
380 per year to about 530. 103 Putting these two trends together,
while one in two exits was by an IPO as recently as the 1990s, only
about one in ten is today. 104
Figure 1. VC-Backed Exits: % IPOs v. % M&As. 105
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YEARBOOK] (tallying VC-backed IPOs from 2008 to 2020).
103. This number is the sum of the average annual exits of VC-backed firms by IPO and
by M&A for 1995 to 2000 and for 2010 to 2015. Between 2015 and 2020, this figure is about
1,030 exits per year. See 2021 YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 38-39; 2016 YEARBOOK, supra
note 102, at 64 fig.4.03, 68 fig.4.07 (tallying VC-backed IPOs and M&As from 1995 to 2015).
The number of firms overall has also increased. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene
M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 465 (2017).
104. Specifically, from a calculated 50 percent to a calculated 14 percent per year, using the
average IPOs and acquisitions for 1995 to 2000 and 2010 to 2015. See 2016YEARBOOK, supra
note 102, at 64 fig.4.03, 68 fig.4.07; infra Figure 1. The average is down to 7.3 percent between
2015 and 2020. See 2021 YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 38-39; see also Xiaohui Gao, Jay R.
Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1663, 1672 (2013) (providing a similar analysis and graph); Where Have All the Public
Companies Gone?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone [https://perma.cc/
SF4F-CVC5] (same). While some of this drop coincides with the dot-com collapse, it was
ongoing even during the boom, and in any event the IPO market has not recovered. See id.
105. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 18; 2014 YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 14
fig.9.0, 15 fig.10.0; 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 64 fig.4.03, 68 fig.4.07. For tallies of
VC-backed IPOs and M&As through 2020, see 2021 YEARBOOK, supra, note 102, at 38-39.
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Acquisitions have filled the gap. The number ofVC-backed firms
acquired has jumped from 190 per year in the 1990s to 450 per year
recently-a nearly 140 percent increase. 106
Over the last ten years, more than 50 percent of the value of each
year's top ten acquisitions has been generated by dominant firms
acquiring horizontal competitors-an amount so large that it reflects over 40 percent of all reported VC-backed acquisition value
across those years. 107 In 2014, for example, eight of the ten largest
disclosed acquisitions appear to have been by incumbents of nascent
or potential rivals. 108 These top eight amounted to $40 billion, or 80
percent of the disclosed value of all VC-backed companies acquired
that year. 109
But large deals are not all or even most of the story. Incumbent
firms are increasingly buying startups. Incumbents are in perhaps
the best position among investors to identify firms that could
threaten them before those firms mature; waiting until those
threats grow in size and value to acquire them-as Facebook
arguably did with WhatsApp--is likely the exception, not the rule. 110
For every large firm acquisition, there are many more, troubling,
incumbent acquisitions of smaller firms, including ones not reported
or tracked by the government. In December 2000, the deal size
triggering antitrust merger review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act was raised from $15 million to $50 million (provided the firms
also meet size-of-the-person criteria), and the Act added a new $200
million threshold to capture other transactions (regardless of firm
size). 111 Since then, the evidence suggests that the share of newly
exempt deals has grown. 112
106. 2014 YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 15 flg.10.0 (tallying VC-backed M&As from 1985

to 2013); 2016YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 68flg.4.07 (same from 1995 to 2015). From 2015
to 2020, the number ofVC-backed firms that were acquired climbed to about 1,030 per year,

representing a roughly 400 percent increase from the 1990s. 2021 YEARBOOK, supra note 102,
at 39 (same from 2008 to 2020).

107. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 18-19.
108. ld. at 19.
109. Id. at 19-20. For total disclosed exit value, see 2016YEARBOOK, supra note 102, at 68
flg.4.07.
110. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 20.
111. ld. at 20-21.
112. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires disclosure and pre-approval of proposed acquisitions over $200 million, as well as acquisitions over $50 million where other "size-of-theperson" test conditions are met. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a); FED. TRADE CoMM'N, STEPS FOR
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A look at the pattern of incumbents' acquisitions shows that they
are acquiring multiple nascent rivals and trying to control strategic
complements that could otherwise destabilize their core business. 113
Facebook, for instance, has acquired over ninety companies, mainly
startups-building and maintaining its userbase partly by acquiring, and then often shuttering, other services. 114 Google, similarly,
has spent over 75 percent of its disclosed $25 billion in acquisitions
since 2008 on competitors. 115 It bought Waze for $1 billion before
Waze or alternative acquirers like Facebook or Apple could challenge Google's mapping supremacy. 116 Mapping is arguably a necessary complement for any firm seeking to compete with Google's core
and future business areas, from search-based ads to autonomous
ridesharing. Apple, too, has been "getting more aggressive and
ambitious" in its acquisitions, buying digital music companies,
DETERMINING WHETHER AN HSR FILING Is REQUIRED, https://www .ftc.gov/sites/defaultlfi.les/
attachments/steps-determining-whether-hsr-filing-required/stepstofil.e.pdf [https:l/perma.

cc/C99R-8ABB]; FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To FiLE OR NOT To FiLE: WHEN You MusT FiLE A
i'REMERGERNOTIFICATIONREPORT FoRM (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attach

ments/ premerger-introductory-guides/guide2.pdf [https:l/perma.cc/5YWS-URRV]. For a study
of the recent policy changes and the market's response, see Thomas G. Wollmann, Stealth

Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-RodinoAct, 1 AM. EcoN. REv.:
INSIGHTS 77, 78-80 (2019) (showing that the recently increased threshold for merger review

led to an increase in acquisitions below the new $50 million threshold); Colleen Cunningham,
Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, 129 J. PoL. EcoN. 649, 663 (2021) (showiog
that a surge of acquisitions occurred just below the thresholds for required merger review

reporting).
113. Lemley & McCreary, supm note 85, at 21; Tim Wu & Stuart A Thompson, The Roots
of Big Tech Run Disturbingly Deep, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https:J/www.nyti.mes.com/in
teractive/2019/06/07/opinion/google-facebook-mergers-acquisitions-antitrust.html [https:/1
perma.oc/T6VQ-KNL7] (noting that ~[b]ig tech' compauleslike Google and Facehook are, in
reality, the products of hundreds of mergers" and documenting those mergers).
114. Mark Glick & Catherine Ruetschlin, Big Tech Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine: The Case of Facebook 3-10 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper
No. 104, 2019). This began early in the company's history and continues to the present day.
See id. at 6 ("The record of Facebook demonstrates how acquisitions can play a critical role
in the rise to dominance and the maintenance of dominance by a Big Tech incumbent."); id.
at 9 fig.1 (tracking acquisitions and user growth); id. at 10 & n.26 (providing examples of
shuttering companies).
115. See Soojung Yeon, How to Be Acquired by Google?: Analysis of Target Firms Acquired
by Google Inc., 22D BIENNIAL CONF. INT'L TELECOMMS. SocY, June 2018, at 1, 8 tbl.1, 15-16
(first showing acquisition amounts in Table 1, and then describing clusters of companies
acquired-with clusters 2, 4, and 5 each composed of businesses in competition with core
aspects of Google's business).
116. Pehr-Johan Norbiick, Lars Persson & Joacim Tag, Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation
in Oligopolistic Network Industries, 37 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2014).
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including Beats (for $3 billion) and Shazam (for a reported $400
million), to retrench its digital music position against attacks by
streaming services like Spotify. 117
This speed and scale of acquisitions is unlike that undertaken by
past incumbents. Cisco completed its first acquisition only in its
ninth year, as its board initially strongly opposed acquisitions. 118
And Microsoft-the network incumbent of a prior generationacquired only one company in its entire first decade of operations
(then twenty-seven in the first decade after it began making acquisitions, with a disclosed sum worth less than $1 billion in today's
dollars). 119 By contrast, Google acquired fifty in its first decade of
operations (and eighty-five in its first decade of acquisitions,
together worth a disclosed $8 billion); 120 and Facebook forty-eight
(sixty in its first decade of acquisitions, worth $25 billion). 121

117. Eric Jhonsa, Apple Is More Willing than Ever to Cut Large Checks to Suppliers and

Startups, THESTREET (Dec. 14, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14420138/

1/apple-spending-more-on-suppliers-and-startups.html [https://perma.cc/82HX-W77C]. No·
tably. Spoti.fy, which has stayed independent, may prove to be the rare example of working
Schumpeterian competition in big tech today.
118. It did so only once threatened by a firm possessing a new generation oftechnology that
Cisco had failed to imagine or develop internally. And Cisco went on to "buil[d] its dominant
market position by acquisition." David Mayer & Martin Kenney, Economic Action Does Not
Take Place in a Vacuum: Understanding Cisco's Acquisition and Development Strategy, 11
INDUS. & iNNOVATION 299, 299, 304-05 (2004).
119. See List of Mergers and Al:quisitions by Microsoft, WIKIPEDIA [hereinafter Microsoft
Mergers], https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li.st_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Microsoft
[https://perma.cc/SP3D-JSRX].
120. See List ofMergers and Acquisitions by Alphabet, WIKIPEDIA, https:l/en.wi.kipedia.org/
wiki!List_of_m.ergers_aod...acquisitions_by...Alphabet [https://perma.cc/J3YT-WTVT].
121. See List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Meta Platforms, WIKIPEDIA, https:l/en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki!List_of_mergers_and_acquisiti.ons_by_Meta_Platforms [https://perma.cc/RG96HJ8P]. This remains true even when all values are converted to today's dollars using U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics's Consumer Price Index. Analysis is on file with authors.
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Figure 2. Acquisitions During First Decade of Business 122
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The pattern of multiple acquisitions of startups by dominant
incumbents creates a problem for antitrust doctrine. Any one
acquisition might or might not restrain competition, because the
startup in question might or might not have survived but for the
acquisition and might or might not have evolved in a way to
challenge the incumbent. But a pattern of acquiring all or most of
the startups that might grow to displace you is an effective way to
dampen the normal waves of Schumpeterian competition that disciplined previous network markets. 123 That may explain why those
competitive waves seem to have stalled; the companies that dominate the digital economy are all more than flfteen years old and
have dominated their market categories for more than a decade. 124
While monopoly alone is not illegal or necessarily problematic,
today's tech monopolists have almost certainly held onto and even
broadened their monopolies by acquiring firms that in another era
would have displaced them. At the very least, these acquisitions
have reduced the likelihood of disruptive innovation that would
challenge the power of those monopolies.
More problematic, incumbents often buy up promising startups
only to shut them down. Sometimes this is intentional. Economists
122. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 23.
123. See id. at 61.
124. See id. at 61-62; Richard J. Gilbert & A. Douglas Melamed, Innovation Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 84 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6-7 (2021) (arguing that Schumpeterian models
"do not justify exempting innovation-related conduct from antitrust enforcement" and that
"[h]igh entry barrier s and network effect s can insulate firms in today's high-t ech economy
from competition for decades'').
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have documented cases of "killer acquisitions," in which companies
buy incipient competitors in order to eliminate the threat they
pose. 125 While especially prominent in biotech, Facebook, Google,
and Oracle have all bought and shut down competing firms, sometimes on the same day. 126 Tim Wu calls this the "Kronos
effect"-killing your competitors in their infancy. 127 Other times
firms engage in "acqui-hires"-buying a startup to get the brainpower it employs, not the products or ideas the startup offers. 128
(Both outcomes often come together: as one tech journalist put it,
"[a]nother day, another acqui-hired shutdown." 12")
But even incumbents that buy startups in good faith often shut
them down within a few years. While companies fail all the time, incumbent mergers seem littered with failures. Facebook alone has
shut down dozens of once-promising projects after it acquired them,
and Google has done the same. 130 Those are not just technologies
125. E.g., Cunningham eta!., supra note 112, at 650.
126. See, e.g., Josh Constine, Facebook Buys and Shuts Down Shopping Site TheFind to
Boost Commerce in Ads, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2015, 4:49 PM), https:lltechcrunch.coml
2015103/13/to-boost-com..m.erce-in-ads-facebook.-buys-and-shuts-down-shopping-site-thefind/
[https://perma.cc/PI'2X-Q8AD]; Ingrid Lunden, After FacebookAcqui-HiredBranch Media in

2014, Founders Shutter Branch (and Potluck), TECHCRUNCH (June 3, 2015, 12:37 PM), https:l/
techcrunch.com/2015/06/03/bye-branch/ [https:l/perma.cc/CLX5-7HT3]; Acquisition of Sun
Microsystems by Oracle Corporation, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_acqui
sition_by_Oracle [https://perma.cc/HXU2-QYXB] (discussing the fate of Sun Microsystems's
open source projects after its acquisition by Oracle); Wu & Thompson, supra note 113

("Facebook has purchased and then shut down 39 companies-nearly baH of its acquisitions.
Many of these shutterin.gs may represent the simple purchase of talent, but others may have
been designed to eliminate future competitors.j; see also Lemley & McCreary, supra note 86.
at 65 n.283 (discussing Google acquisitions shut down).
127. See TIM WU. THE MAsTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 25

(1st ed. 2010).

128. See, e.g., Neha Bhargava & Vishwanath Venugopalan, Acqui-Hires: Revolutionizing
Strategy & Transforming Organizational Structures 3-4 (Jan. 31, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https:l/mackinstitute.wharton.upenn.edulwp-content/uploads/2013101/BhargavaNeha-Venugopalan-VishwanatiLFinal-Paper_MKTG-890-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6TGJQVE].
129. Lunden, supra note 126.
130. For an overview ofFacebook's acquisitions and a report on the thirty-nine companies
shut down, see Wu & Thompson, supra note 113. See also Glick & Ruetschlin, supra note 114,
at 10 & n.26. For examples of Google's acquired companies whose services were then shut
down, see Ron Amadeo, Google's Constant Product Shutdowns Are Damaging Its Brand, Ails

TECHNICA (Apr. 2, 2019, 7:45AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/04/googles-constantproduct-shutdowns-are-d.a.m.aging-its-brand/ [https://perma.cc/4TDG-DBE8]; see also Nicholas

Carlson, How a Great Google Workplace Turned into a 'Nightmare, • Bus. INsiDER (June 25,
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that no longer compete with the monopolist; they are technologies
that we no longer have access to at all because of the acquisition.
It's hard to know for sure whether any one of these acquisitions
(except possibly the outright killer acquisitions) stopped a competitive challenge that would have panned out but for the merger. 131 But
it seems extremely likely that the cumulative effect of a dominant
firm acquiring dozens of startups led to an overall reduction in
expected competition. The probability of any one acquisition harming competition is often below 51 percent, but the probability of a
pattern of acquisitions harming competition is much greater.
Antitrust's focus on provable causation by a specific act causes it to
ignore a pattern of acquisitions that serves to maintain market
dominance.

2013, 9:24AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-zagat-story-2013-6#ixzz3YkUB8WBn
[https://perma.cc/A2BM-DM4F] (describing Google's acquisition ofZagat as it aimed to solidify
its restaurant recommendations in connection with local searches and in competition with
Yelp and the subsequent diminishment of Zagat's brand); Alex Hern, Revolv Devices Bricked
as Google's Nest Shuts Down Smart Home Company, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016, 5:04AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/06/revolv-devices-bricked-google-nestsmart-home [https://perma.cc/BXK9-RB7Q]; Miranda Miller, Google Acquires (and Shuts
Down) Trust Seal Company K"U.Score, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (June 4, 2012), https:/lwww.
searchenginewatch.com/2012/06/04/google-acquires-and-shuts-down-trust-seal-companykikscorel [https:l/perma.cc/7GSN-FMA5]; Jordan Novet, Google Has Shut Down the Product
Itkquired with Former Cloud Leader Diane Greene, CNBC (Aug. 27, 2019, 9:15 PM), https:l/
www.cnbc.com/2019/08/27/google-shuts-down-hire-the-product-it-acquired-with-dianegreene.html [https://perma.cc/V3GS-FQT5]; Catherine Shu, Google to Close Bump and Flock,
Its Recently kquired File Sheoing Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Jao. 1, 2014, 1:52AM), https:l/tech
crunch.com/2013/12/311google-to-close-bump-and-flock-its-recently-acquired-flle-sharing-appsl
[https:l/perma.crJQXR8-SWTE]. It is not clear in all cases whether Google left those technologies fallow or incorporated them into its own services.

131. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Jacob Philipoom, A Certain Harm Overlooked: The Case

of Nascent Competitors Revisited 1 (2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.coml
abstract=3820026 [https:l/perma.cciQK7R-GJK2] (agencies and courts "could never arrive at
such a precise (J.gUre with any confidence").
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2. Noncompete Agreements and Exclusive Dealing 182
A second category of circumstances that can create probabilistic harm involves agreements that restrict employee mobility.
Noncompete agreements are contracts that prohibit employees from
working for or becoming a competitor for a certain period of time. 133
The use of noncompetes is on the rise in the United States. 184
Employment agreements routinely prohibit workers from accepting
a competitor's job offer, and/or from working in a competing business for a specified period in a certain geographic area. 185 The
Treasury Department recently estimated that nearly thirty million
workers are bound by noncompete provisions. 136 A study of executive
employment contracts found that 70 percent of the firms investigated imposed noncompetes on their top employees. 137 A 2021 study
found that noncompetes are also common for nonexecutive employees with base salaries below $100,000 per year. 188 A 2019 report
noted that "[t]he use of non-competes is so pervasive that even
volunteers in non-profit organizations, in states that do not even
132. Portions of this Subsection are adapted from MARK LEMLEY & 0RLY LoBEL, SUPPORT-

ING TALENT MOBILITY & ENHANCING HUMAN CAPITAL: BANNING NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS

TO CREATE COMPETITIVE JOB MARKETS, DAY ONE PROJECT 2-3 (2021), https://law.stanford.
edulwp-contentluploads/2021/01/Supporting-Talent-Mobility-and-Enhancing-Human-CapitalBanning-Noncompete-Agreements-to-Create-Competitive-Job-Markets-Jan2021.pdf
[https://perrna.cc/KHB3-Y56L].
133. See Alison Doyle, What Is a Noncompete Agreement?, BALANCE CAREERS (July 6, 2020),

https://www.thebalancecareers.com/what-is-a-non-compete-agreement-2062045 [https:/1
perma.cc/USZR-CACN].
134. EvAN STARR, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., TBE USE, ABUSE, AND ENFORCEABILITY OF NON-

COMPETE AND NO-POACH AGREEMENTS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE THEORY, EviDENCE, AND

RECENT REFORM EFFORTS 4-5 (2019), https://eig.org/noncompetesbri.ef [https://perma.cc/
RF6F-MNQT].
135. See Sophie Quinton, Why Janitors Get Noncompete Agreements, Too, 8TATEIJNE (May
17, 2017), https:/lwww.pewtrusts.org/enlresearch-and-anslysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/17/wbyjanitors·get-noncompete·agreements-too [https://perma.ce/ZBMM-CSGN].
136. U.S. DEP'TOFTREASURY, NON-COMPETE CoNTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 6 (2016), https://hom.e.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Non_Compete_Contracts_
Econimic_Effects_and_Policy_lmplications_MAR2016.pdf[https:l/perma.cc/66PW-7NST];see
also STARR, supra note 134, at 5.
137. Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 376, 396 (2011).
138. See Christopher B. Seaman, Noncompetes and Other Post-Employment Restraints on
Competition: Empirical Evidence from Trade Secret Litigation, 72 HAsTINGS L.J. 1183, 1217
(2021).
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enforce them, are asked to sign away their post-employment
freedom." 139
Workers currently have limited recourse when it comes to
contesting noncompetes. Court decisions in cases involving noncompetes are highly unpredictable, and litigation can be prohibitively expensive and burdensome for individual employees. Some
states-notably California, 140 but more recently including Massachusetts, Washington, Maryland, and New Hampshire 141-have
passed laws voiding most noncompetes, but this state-specific
legislative patchwork can be difficult for workers to understand.
Many employees, especially those outside the professional class,
end up complying with noncompetes even if they aren't enforceable
in the state in which they work (or are planning to move to for a
new job). 142 Moreover, more and more people are employed at
companies with a national presence. Such companies often demand
adherence to a noncompete nationwide, even for employees in a
state that won't enforce noncompetes. 143
Inconsistent state rules have also led to conflicts across state lines
when an employee bound by a noncompete moves to a state that
doesn't enforce them. This has resulted in a "race to the courthouse"
when employees change jobs, as each side tries to get its own state
law to apply. 144 It has even led to the unseemly spectacle of courts
in different states attempting to prohibit each other from enforcing
139. See STARR, supra note 134, at 2 (footnote omitted).

140. Section 16600 of California's Business and Professions Code prohibits contracts that

restrain a person•s ability to engage in lawful employment. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE§ 16600
{West 2021). Courts have consistently interpreted the law to ban employment noncompetes.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 297 (Cal. 2008).
141. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 24L (2021); Washington Senaf<l Votes to Restrict NonCompete Contracts, AsSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 6, 2019), https://apnews.comlarticle/f602la2164
654Sdcabc382d3095abe2b [https://perma.cc/K78A-XTA2]; Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Maryland
Bans Non-CompewAgreement8for Low Wage Workers, JDSUPRA(July 17, 2019), https://www.

jdsupra.com/legalnews/maryland-bans-non-compete-agreements-43720/ [https://perm.a.oo/
Y9JE-NWS6]; Elisaveta Dolghih & Kenneth B. Walton, New Hampshire Bans Non-Compete
Agreements for Low Wage Employees, LEWIS BRISBOIS (July 22, 2019), https:lll.ewisbrisbois.
comlnewsroomllegal-alertslnew-hampshire-bans-non-compete-agreements-for-low-wageemployees [https:l/perma.cc/TMB9-ZCQB].
142. See STARR, supra note 134.
143. See id.
144. See Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 82 (Ct. App. 1998);
see also FeiTofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1466 (4th
Cir. 1992).
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their respective state policies.' 46 Finally, the complex legal landscape surrounding noncompetes further entrenches established
companies. Companies with substantial legal and financial resources can be more aggressive in using noncompetes to drive out
competition even when their legal claims are on weak grounds. 146
Incumbents may even use a reputation for suing employees who
leave as a strategy to deter other employees from leaving. 147
"By restricting employees from switching employers or starting
their own competing businesses, noncompetes [in the aggregate]
have harmful economic effects." 148 They increase market concentration, reduce innovation and entrepreneurship, and impede efforts to
correct inequities in labor markets. In the past decade, a wealth of
research-including diverse empirical, experimental, and theoretical studies-has revealed the adverse effects of noncompete
contracts and similar restrictions on the free movement of human
capital. 149 Research on the question of labor market mobility has
taken multiple forms: longitudinal studies, comparative regional
studies, patent network mapping, surveys, behavioral lab experiments, ethnographies, simulations, and modeling. 150

145. See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic,ln£., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 236 (2002).
146. Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of
Intellectual Property, 93 TEl<. L. REV. 789, 851 (2015); David S. Scharfstein & Patrick Bolton,
A Theory ofPredation Based on .Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, 80 AM. EcoN. REv.
93, 104 (1990).
147. Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Reputations for Toughness
in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers via Inventor Mobility, 30
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1349, 1367 (2009); see also Jamal Shamsie, The Context of Dominance:
An Industry-Driven Framework for Exploiting Reputation, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 199, 209
(2003).
148. LEMLEY & LoBEL, supra note 132, at 2.
149. ld. at 3 (citing Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and
the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55MGMT. Sm. 875 (2009); Garmaise, supra note 137;
Sharon Belenzon & Mark Schan.k.erman, Spreading the Word: Geography, Policy, and
Knowledge Spillovers, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 884 (2013); Kenneth A Younge, Tony W. Tong
& Lee Fleming, How Anticipated Employee Mobility Affects Acquisition Likelihood: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 686 (2015); Evan P. Starr, J.J. Prescott
& Norman D. Bishara, Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force, 64 J.L. & EcoN. 63
(2021); Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds: How Employers Fix the Talent Marhet, 59 BANTA
CLARA L. REV. 663 (2020)).
150. See ORLY LoBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 67-72 (2013).
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[T]he research has leveraged exogenous shifts in state policy,
including changes in Michigan (1980), Vermont (2005), Oregon
(2008), South Carolina (2010), Georgia (2010), and Hawaii
(2015). Studies also examine enforcement differences between
states that do enforce noncompetes ... finding correlation be·
tween weak enforcement, increased mobility, and positive
outcomes in those regions [that support job mobility]. 161
Granted, there are plausible justifications for noncompetes unrelated to the suppression of competition, such as the reduction of
transfer costs/disruptions or the protection of trade secrets. But
carefully written laws and contracts already provide suitable alternative ways to protect the legitimate interests of employers. As a
2018 article states, "policymakers, economists, and legal scholars ...
overwhelmingly conclude that the harms of noncompetes far
outweigh their potential benefits."152 The research shows that lifting
noncompete restrictions-thereby increasing job mobility-is good
for entrepreneurship, wages, industry and regional economic
growth, and equality. 153
Enforcement of noncompetes favors large, incumbent firms. 154
Studies have found that markets become more concentrated when
noncompetes are adopted and enforced. 155 When employees sign
noncompetes with established firms, start-up companies have
difficulty recruiting talent. Indeed, a ban on noncompetes in
California generated greater and faster innovation because employees with good ideas that their employer did not want to use
were able to take those ideas elsewhere. 156
151. Orly Lobel, Noncompete&, Human Capital Policy & Regional Competition, 45 J. CoRP.
L. 931, 942 (2020). But see Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichehnan, The Case for Noncompete&,

87 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 1010-26 (2020) (criticizing the methodology of these studies but not
identifying evidence pointing in the other direction).
162. Rebecca N. Morrow, Noncompetes as Tax Evasion, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 266, 268-69
(2018).
153. LEMLEY & LoBEL, supra note 132, at 3 (citing Starr et al., supra note 149; Lobel, supra
note 146).
154. Lobel, supra note 151, at 939 (citing Hyo Kang & Lee Fleming, Non-Competes,
Business Dynamism, and Concentration: Evidence from a Florida Case Study, 29 J. EcoN. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 663 (2020)).
166. Kang & Fleming, supra note 164, at 676.
156. LEMLEY & LoBEL, supra note 132, at 3 (citing ANNALEE 8AXENI.AN, REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND RoUTE 128, at 59-82 (1996);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
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But it is hard to trace that increased concentration and decreased
innovation to any one particular agreement with a particular
employee. The agreements are usually signed when an employee
joins the company. Neither employers nor employees are likely to
know when an employee joins the company whether that employee
will want to leave, what they will do if and when they do leave, and
how preventing them from taking a job in their chosen field will
affect competition and innovation at some point in the indeterminate future. That means that antitrust law has a hard time dealing
with noncompetes. 167 To an even greater extent than mergers, any
one noncompete may or may not affect competition, but some significant number of the tens of millions of noncompetes in force in
the United States surely do affect competition.'""
One potential way to reduce the probabilistic nature of the
competitive harm from noncompetes is to view a company's entire
portfolio of noncompetes rather than individual agreements as a
single act. But even if existing antitrust law would allow that, many
of the competitive harms from noncompetes come from the fact that
all or most of the companies in an industry use them, making
employee mobility and new startups in the entire industry difficult.
Noncompetes can be thought of in probabilistic terms-that is,
one noncompete may have a small chance of impeding competition,
but a large enough number of noncompetes by a company that each
have a small chance of harming competition may certainly do harm.
Noncompetes also can be thought of in synergistic terms-that is,
we might view each individual noncompete as legal but still be
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575 (1999); David Balan,
Competitive Edge: Why Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts Are by and Large
Harmful to U.S. Workers and tke U.S. Economy, EQmTABLE GROWTH (Jan. 28, 2021), https:/1
equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-why-noncompete-clauses-in-employment-contracts-areby-and-large-harmful-to-u-s-workers-and-the-u-s-economy/ [https:l/perma.cc/Q66C-K283]).
167. To be sure, this is less of a problem in states that ban noncompetes, though even there
evidence suggests companies continue to impose them, and employees may be unaware that
those terms are unenforceable. Starr et al., supra note 149. But most states enforce them as
a matter of contract law.
158. In theory, antitrust law could simply wait until after the noncompete had an
anticompetitive effect and declare it unlawful then. But it would be hard to unravel the effects
of the noncompete at that point. People who couldn't apply for jobs (or couldn't accept the jobs
they were offered) are unlikely to return years later to take those jobs. And in any event it is
the aggregation ofnoncompetes across numerous employees that is likely to be of competitive
concern.
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concerned about the combined effect of an industry full ofthem. We
consider those synergistic arguments below.

B. Synergistic Antitrust Violations
Fields as diverse as philosophy, chemistry, industrial organization, and professional sports are familiar with the Aristotelian
notion that the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts. 159
Gestalt theory holds that any characteristic of the whole cannot be
understood by studying each of the parts in isolation. 160 Labor
assembly lines allow groups of unskilled laborers to increase output
beyond what even skilled workers could accomplish by laboring
individually.'"' Professional football teams rely on players performing remarkably distinct tasks-a center hiking the ball, a quarterback tossing the ball downfield, a receiver catching a pass-in
service of the cooperative dynamics that produce a winning game;
star-driven teams may find themselves left in the dust. 162 Mixing a
catalyst with another chemical component can produce a reaction
beyond what either component could accomplish on its own. 163
Although Aristotle himself did not express the quote precisely as
it is generally attributed, 164 the concept resonates powerfully across
159. See 1 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1045a (Hugh Tredennick trans., 1993).
160. See D. Brett King, Michael Wertheimer, Heidi Keller & Kevin Crochetiere, The Legacy
of Ma:s: Wertheimer and Gestalt Psychology, 61 Soc. RsCH. 907, 910-11 (1994) (explaining the
origins and nature of Gestalt theory); Patricia Bauer, Gestalt Psychology, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (May 26, 2020), https:llwww.britannica.com/science/Gestalt-psychology [https:/1

perm.a.cc/2829-V343] (explaining that the name of the theory itself derives from German terminology describing how parts are joined together).
161. See DAVID E. NYE, AMERICA'S AsSEMBLY LINE 21-22 (2013) (using Adam Smith's
eighteenth-century observation that when employing a strict division of labor, a team of ten
or more workers with minimal skills could produce and package 48,000 pins in a single day,
whereas a single worker could not make even twenty pins in one day, to describe the subdivision of labor as one of the key features of an assembly line); Melvin Kranzberg & Michael
T. Hannan, History of the Organization of Work, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 2, 2017),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-work-organization-648000 [https://perma.cc/
DZ2A-5KBW].
162. See Roderick I. Swaab, Michael Schaerer, Eric M. Anicich, Richard Ronay & Adam D.
Galinsky, The Too-Much-Talent Effect: Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent
Is Too Much or Not Enough, 25 PsYcH. Scr. 1581, 1590 (2014).
163. See GEOFFREY M. CoOPER, THE CELL: A MOLECULAR APPROACH 64-65 (8th ed. 2018);
Erik Gregersen, Catalyst, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.britan

nica.comlscience/catalyst [https://perm.a.cc/G7SR-VMRR].
164. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 159, at 1045a.
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the millennia. One would miss the intricate harmonies of a symphony if the notes were considered separately. 165 And so it is with
antitrust. By adopting an overly atomistic approach, modern antitrust law frequently misses the synergistic power of actions in
concert.
In particular, modern atomistic analyses suffer from a failure to
recognize and respond to synergistic antitrust violations. One can
define synergistic antitrust violations as a series of acts that independently cause only a small amount of harm to competition, but
which taken together restrict competition by a large amount, an
amount that may be larger than the simple sum of the activities.
The synergistic effect can be the effects of multiple actions combined
or the effects of actions in multiple markets combined. It is the
multiplicity that matters, something that atomistic antitrust misses
entirely.

1. Multiple Actions
Synergistic antitrust violations occur when a market actor
engages in a series of actions that operate in concert to frustrate or
delay competition. Each individual action might not stop competition or restrict it enough to overcome the barriers we described in
Part I. Each action may even be legal, if taken standing alone.
Taken together, however, each action is part of an overall scheme to
monopolize a market or maintain monopoly power.
Modern pharmaceutical markets are rife with synergistic anticompetitive activities. Companies are particularly likely to build
walls of "evergreen" IP and non-IP protection around successful
drug innovations. 166 Drug discovery is expensive, 167 so the patent
165. Cf. DOVID LIEBERMAN, HOW FREE WILL WoRKS:THEBLUEPRINTSTOTAKECHARGEOF
YoUR LIFE, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 295 (2015) (using the analogy of a musician, along with
a chef's ingredients and an artist's colors, in describing three modalities of perfection).
166. See Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J .L. &BIOBCIENCES 590,639

(2018).
167. Sources differ widely on the extent of the cost to develop a drug and the validity of
various measures, but the amount is certainly not small. Compare Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry
G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 25-27 (2016} (Tufts Center study estimating
costs of developing new drug at approximately $2.5 billion), with Steve Morgan, Paul
Grootendorst, Joel Lexchin, Colleen Cunningham & Devon Greyson, The Cost of Drug
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system provides needed incentives to engage in pharmaceutical
innovation. From a constitutional perspective, however, the patent
system is designed to operate for the benefit of society, rather than
for the benefit of individual inventors. 168 Successful innovators
receive a limited time in which to attempt to garner a return on
their investments through the power to exclude others from the
market, 169 after which competitors should be able to enter the
market and drive prices down.
In recent decades, however, pharmaceutical companies have
become adept at strategic behavior that extends the time and scope
of their protections. These include building "walls" of patents,' 70
evergreening, 171 product hopping, 172 pay-for-delay settlements, 173
Development: A Systematic Review, 100 HEALTH POL'Y 4, 9 (2011) (literature review estimatingthat drug development costs range from $161 million to $1.8 billion); see also Feldman,
supra note 166, at 625 (noting that the Tufts Center study focuses solely on new chemical
entities, while most new drugs are repurposed versions of existing ones); Aaron E. Carroll,
$2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMEs
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-rosts-of-devel
oping-a-new-drug.html (https://perma.cc/J5BQ-V95Z] (noting that the Tufts study was funded
by the pharmaceutical industry and criticizing the Tufts study methodology).
168. See, e.g., Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55 (1923) (highlighting the
purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution as promoting the progress of
science and the useful arts, whereas the ''monopoly in the making, use and vending'' of the
invention for a limited number of years is merely the reward to the inventor).
169. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries'').
170. See Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorph& and Prodrugs and
Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of "Secondary" Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLoS ONE
1 (2012).
171. See Feldman, supra note 166, at 601-04.
172. See RoBIN FELDMAN & EVANFRDNDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES
AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 69-79 (2017) (discussing examples of product hopping);
1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARKD.JANIS, MARKA. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHERR. LESIJE &MICHAEL
A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTiTRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST i'RINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUALPlioPERTYLAW § 12.05 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing the phenomenon ''product-hopping'?.
173. See generally Feldman, supra note 70, at 64-66; FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note
172, at 34-35; Robin Feldman, Evan Frondorf, Andrew K. Cordova & Connie Wang, Empirical
Evidence of Drug Pricing Games-A Citizen's Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REv.
39, 4 7-48 (2017); Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay,
18 Cm.-KENT J. INTELL. PRoP. 249, 254-57 (2019); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay:
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,
1562-67 (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 CoLUM. L. REV. 629, 634-36 (2009); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 5; Steve D. Shadowen, Keith B. Leffier & Joseph T. Lukens,
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filing citizen petitions at the FDA, 174 refusing to cooperate with
potential generic manufacturers to provide needed samples for testing, 175 and using volume discounts to block cheaper generics from
health insurance formularies, 176 although the list is by no means
exhaustive. In this Subsection, we briefly describe each of these
techniques. 177
While pharmaceuticals have traditionally been an industry where
a single key patent covers a new drug, that is changing. Companies
pile large numbers of patents onto existing drugs to bolster
protection. 178 Some of the claims may be of questionable validity;
some of the patents may be of questionable validity entirely. 179
Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2009);
Matthew Avery & Msry Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs: Declaratory Judgment

Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15N.C.J.L. &TECH.l (2013) (discussing how payto-delay settlements prevent market entry to later ANDA filers as well as the difficulty of
obtaining declaratory relief against the pharmaceutical patent holder); Jessie Cheng, An
Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 CoLUM. L. REv.
1471 (2008).
174. See F'ELDMAN&FRONDORF, supra note 172, at 91-92; Feldman eta!., supra note 173,
at 51-55; Carrier & Wander, supra note 70, at 259-63; Carrier & Minniti, supra note 70.
175. See FELDMAN &FRoNDORF, supra note 172, at 80-91; see also OFF. OF GENERIC DRUGS,
U.S. FooD &DRUGADMIN., 2020ANNuALREPORT 7 (2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/genericdrugs/office-generic-druge-2020-annual-report [https:l/perma.cc!RUYB-GDTF] (discussing the
Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act enacted by
Congress in 2019 to promote competition by generic drugs in the pharmaceutical market-

place).

176. See Robin Feldman, The Devil in the Tiers, 8 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, 1, 13-15 (2021);
RoBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 21-26 (2019); Christy A. Rentmeester & Robert I. Garis, Rebat<s
and Spreads: Pharmacy Benefit Management Practices and Corporate Citizenship, 33 J.
HEALTH PoL. PoL'y & L. 943, 948-50 (2008).

177. For in-depth analysis of these and other approaches, see generally FELDMAN &
FRoNDORF, supra note 172; FELDMAN, supra note 176; GERALD PoSNER, PHARMA: GREED, LIES,

AND THE POISONING OF AMERICA (2020).
178. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE CoURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 21-22 (2009); see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It
Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MicH.
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH
ECON. 327, 337 (2012).

179. Patent examiners have a limited period of time to consider each application, some of
which may have dozens or even hundreds of claims. See RoBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT
LAw 49-60 (2012). Scholars have documented the fact that many patents are improperly
granted or improperly asserted against parties whose products do not infringe the claims. See
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001)
(estimating that patent examiners spend an average of eighteen hours over a two- to three-
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Nevertheless, each patent adds to the cost and delay that a
competitor must take into account when contemplating entering the
market. 180 Even the process of evaluating numerous patents absorbs
time and resources. And because generic drug makers can't launch
a product until every listed patent expires or is successfully
challenged, 181 listing multiple patents, no matter how dubious,
makes it harder to compete with the patent owner. 182 Pharmaceutical companies make the problem worse by engaging in "evergreening''--{)btaining later patents on minor aspects of a drug that
nonetheless block generic entry. 183
In addition to patents, companies can rely on more than a dozen
non-patent exclusivities that are available through the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). 184 These include data exclusivity
for new chemical industries, orphan drug designation, which
provides seven years of exclusivity along with other benefits, and
pediatric exclusivity offered in exchange for studying the safety of
drugs in children. 185 Some non-patent exclusivities operate to
year period examining each patent, thus resulting in the improper issuance of many patents
that should have been rejected); Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 58, at 26466 (discussing both improperly granted and improperly asserted patents).
180. See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 58, at 264.
181. Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides an automatic thirty-month stay of
approval of any generic petition while the patent case is resolved. If the case goes on longer
than thirty months, generics can theoretically launch "at risk"-that is, get approval and
enter the market while it is pending, taking the risk of having to pay damages if they lose the
suit. But few generics do so. See In re Nexi.um (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Li.tig., 842 F.3d 34,
40-41 (1st Cir. 2016).
182. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 819, 822 (N.D.

lll. 2020) (rejecting an antitrust claim based on accumulating and asserting hundreds of
patents covering a single biologic).
183. See. e.g., 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 79, § 15.03[A][2][a].
184. See generally Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J .L. &
ARTS 53 (2016) (describing thirteen non-patent exclusivities); JOEINR. THOMAS, CoNG. RscH.
SERV., R42890, THE RoLE OF PATENTS AND REGULATORY ExCLUS1VlTIES IN PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION (2014).
185. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 74-75; see also Robin Feldman, The Cancer Curse:
Regulatory Failure by Success, 21 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1. 15 (2020) (describing the

secondary effects of the Orphan Drug Act as "uncontrolled wildfire"); Michael G. Daniel,
Timothy M. Pawlik, Amanda N. Fader, Nestor F. Esnaola & Martin A. Ma.kary, The Orphan
Drug kt: Restoring tlu! Mission to Rare Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210. 211-12
(2016) (discussing the abuse of orphan drug protections and exclusivity benefits); Sarah Jane
Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Manipulate Orphan Drug Rules to Create Prized
Morwpolies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), https:/lkhn.org/newsldrugm.a.kers-manipulate-orphan-drug·rules-to-create-prized-monopolies [https:llperma.cd7XVK-93JT] (noting
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prevent generics or biosimilars from using existing clinical trial data
for a period of time. 186 Some extend the time of existing patents or
other exclusivities, 187 while others are available even if all patents
have expired or have been invalidated. 188 Still others are granted for
engaging in clinical testing, even if that testing proves unsuccessful
or is pointless. 189 Each exclusivity program may exist for sound
that seven of the ten drugs with the highest annual sales revenue in 2016 were orphan drugs).
186. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2)-(3) (1995) (if a branded drug is designated as a new
chemical entity, generic hopefuls may not use clinical trial data from the branded drug company for five years, with the period shortened to four years if a generic hopeful files for FDA
approval certifying its intent to challenge the patent on the drug); THOMAS, supra note 184,
at 4-5 (discussing data exclusivity and the ways generic drug companies may use the safety
and efficacy information submitted by branded drug companies); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)-(B)
(under the Biologics Act, which governs biologic drugs, the ori.gin.al biologic drug maker
receives twelve years of data rights, during the first four years of which no follow-on
companies may apply).

187. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(5)(ii) (2020) (when a generic company engages in new clinical studies on improvements on existing drugs (rather than new entities), generic hopefuls
may not use the clinical trial data for three years); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (for new biologic
drugs, following four years in which no other biologic drug maker can apply to make the drug,
even using their own original data, the new biologic drug company receives eight years in
which no biosimilar or interchangeable may reference the original drug company's data); Food
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 801, 126 Stat.
993, 1077 (2012) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3551) (establishing the Qualified
Infectious Disease Products (QDIP) program, which extends by five years the period in which
biosimilars and interchangeability of drugs for certain diseases may not use data from the
original company for new entities and new clinical studies); Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Frequently Asked
Questions on Pediatric Exclusivity (505A), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 30, 2016), https:/1
www .fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/qualifying-pediatric-exclusivity-under-section505a-federal-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act-frequently [https:l/perma.cc/r7ZZ-FPYM] [hereinafter FDA FAQs] (describing the pediatric studies exclusivity which provides a six- month
extension of either patent or data rights for completing clinical trials of a drug on children);
see also WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RBCH. SERV., R41114, THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 3 (2012) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156) (explaining that
the patent term for pharmaceutical patents may be extended for up to five years based on
time lost during clinical testing); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[The brand-name companies] gain for themselves, it is asserted, a de facto
monopoly of upwards of2 years by enjoining FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the
patent on the drug's active ingredient expires.").
188. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aa note (Congreesional Fincfings) (granting adcfitional exclusivity
to makers of "orphan drugs'' that serve small populations).
189. See Renu La!, Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONS. 2 (May 19, 2015),
https:llwww.fda.gov/media/92548/download [https://perma.cc/3VAR-D7V8] (explaining that
the pediatric exclusivity adds six months of market protection); FDA FAQs, supra note 187
(explaining how the FDA determines an applicant's eligibility for pediatric exclusivity). For
a discussion of regulatory exclusivities and the abuses thereof, see Feldman, supra note 184.
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policy reasons. Nevertheless, as with patents, companies have
become adept at adding these exclusivities to the pile of patents that
create impenetrable walls of protection.
Patent and non-patent exclusivities are not the only IP rights
companies use to block competition. Although patents should, in
theory, provide full information for those who would make the
innovation when the patent expires, the reality is far from the
ideal. 190 Particularly with biologic drugs, much of the key information is embodied in what is known as ''know-how" and "show-how"
information that companies do not reveal in the patent but maintain
as trade secrets. 191 Thus, pharmaceutical companies can extend
their practical control over biologics even after the expiration of
every patent in the wall. 192
In addition to patent walls, some pharmaceutical companies
extend protection by engaging in a behavior known as product hopping. With product hopping, companies make small changes to a
drug's dosage, formulation, or delivery system just before a drug's
protection expires. 193 The company then uses advertising tactics to
push patients and prescribing physicians onto the new version, even
if there is little clinical difference between the two drugs. 194 Indeed,
product hopping generally relies on the difference at the FDA
between drugs that are ''bioequivalent'' and those that are "AB
rated." 195 A pharmaceutical company can switch to a drug so similar
that it is bioequivalent without having to do any new testing or get
190. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1849,
1851-53 (2016) (explaining that patent applicants hold back their most valuable information

as trade secrets and noting that patent disclosures are relatively poor teaching tools).
191. See Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The Vww from the
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 251-52 (2014) (explaining the gap
between a patented idea and a viable product).
192. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition

and Innovation, 101 IowA L. REV. 1023, 1027-28 (2016).
193. See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 172, at 69-71; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note
79, § 12.05; Michael A Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (2016).
194. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARv.J.ONLEGIS. 499, 527-31 (2016) (discussing the shifts from Prilosec
to Nexium, despite a lack of evidence ofNexium's added benefits, and from Asacol to Delzicol,
which only added an ineffective coating to the original tablets already containing a stomachprotective coating). For a discussion of this approach and its problems, see Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 5.
195. See Carrier & Shadowen, supra DDte 193, at 175.
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FDA approval. In the case of TriCor, for instance, Abbott Laboratories switched from capsule form to tablet form and withdrew the
capsules from the market, then switched to a new tablet dosage and
withdrew the old tablets from the market. 196 The active ingredient
was "bioequivalent," so the brand could rely on all its old safety and
efficacy data in filing for approval for the new drug. But because the
entire formulation wasn't identical, it wasn't "AB-rated'' for generic
substitution, so generic companies cleared to sell capsules had to
start over again trying to get approval to sell tablets.' 97 Any cost
associated with filing a revised new drug application was a small
price to pay in return for all of the time without a competitor that
the switch bought Abbott.
Many companies engage in multiple product hops, as Abbott did,
timed to lock out a generic competitor just as they are poised to
defeat the first round of patents and enter the market. And
pharmaceutical companies also tend to get (generally dubious)
patents on the new, minor changes, starting the patent wall process
again.
Still other techniques for extending patent life involve pay-fordelay settlements, in which a brand company provides something of
value to a potential generic in exchange for the generic agreeing to
stay off the market, 198 filing meritless so-called "citizen'' petitions
with the FDA against a potential competitor, 199 and refusing to
provide samples to or otherwise cooperate with potential competitors in the FDA approval process. 200
196. See Abbott Lab'ys v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415·18 (D. Del.
2006).
197. Id.
198. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 140-41 (2013); 1 HOVENKAMPET AL., supra note
79, § 16:01; Hemphill, supra note 173, at 1557.
199. See FELDMAN &FRONDORF, supra note 172, at 91-92; Feldman et al., supra note 173,
at 51-54; Carrier & Minniti, supra note 70, at 331-33 (fmding that between 2011 and 2015,
brand companies filed 92 percent of 505(q) petitions, with the FDA denying 92 percent of
those petitions); Carrier & Wander, supra note 70, at 261-263; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 79, § 15.03[A][2][a].
200. See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 172, at 80-91 (discussing Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies (REMS)-based delay); see also CREATES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-94,
§ 610, 133 Stat. 2534, 3130 (2019) (codified as amended at 21 U.S. C. § 355-2); Michael A.
Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust Framework, 103 CoRNELL L. REV. 1,
41-44 (2017).
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All of these techniques work to delay or deter competitors from
getting to market. 201 Most important, once a competitor does get to
market, drug companies then use contracting processes such as
volume discounts and most-favored-nation clauses to ensure that
the competitor cannot gain much traction. 202
Some of this conduct, like pay-for-delay settlements and some
particularly egregious forms of product hopping, may themselves
be antitrust violations, though it took decades to firmly establish
that those practices could even be challenged under the antitrust
laws. But some of it is, standing alone, immune from antitrust
scrutiny. It's not illegal to obtain a patent, or lots of them. It's not
illegal to file citizen petitions with the FDA, or lots of them. It's not
illegal to obtain regulatory exclusivities, or lots of them. But in
concert, these acts work to significantly delay generic competition
even after the patentee has had its legitimate period of exclusivity.
Worse, they can be timed to reinforce each other. 208 A new evergreen
patent can support a product hop, causing years of delay."04 A citizen
petition timed just before generic entry can derail the Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) approval process. A company can
seek pediatric exclusivity or an orphan drug designation timed to interfere with generic entry that was otherwise imminent. And so on.
The anticompetitive conduct adds up, and each piece reinforces the
others, preventing competition for years or even decades longer than
the law intended.

2. Multiple Markets
In addition to multiple behaviors working in concert, synergistic
behaviors can also arise from the interaction of multiple markets.
Consider the behavior of patent aggregators. Mostly they are a
subset of those patent plaintiffs known as non practicing entities or

201. See Ana Santos Rutschman, Regulatory Malfunctions in the Drug Patent Ecosystem,
70 EMORYL.J. 347, 376-83 (2020).
202. See generally Feldman, supra note 86.
203. See Carrier, supra note 200.
204. See, e.g., Michael A Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:
The Missing Dimension of Product-Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1009-12 (2010) (discussing
how pay-for-delay agreements can facilitate and compound product hopping).
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patent trolls.'05 For our purposes, the relevant question relates to
the behavior of those who hold large numbers of patents, rather
than whether the entity "practices" the IP to produce a product.
The definition of "market power" when it comes to patents is itself
fraught. There is a sense in which each patent potentially confers
power in a relevant market, since it is a unique good. But most
patents don't confer any practical power because they have substitutes."06 Of course, a patent holder controlling a monopoly of the
patents for all of the relevant substitutes could hold power, assuming the absence of effective substitutes in the public domain.
Nonetheless, unlike a product market-in which there can be only
one monopolist-many patent owners can each control a market
with a sufficiently strong patent or portfolio, because those patents
can overlap or "block" each other.'07 If one person owns a patent on
tires, a second owns a patent on a steering wheel, and a third owns
a patent on an engine, they each have "market power" over cars in
the sense that no one can build a car without permission from each
of them. From this perspective, one might have concerns about a
patent aggregator collecting patents in a single field. The potential
for mischief, however, runs deeper.
Aggregators amass large numbers of patents, frequently covering
a variety of fields, asserting those patents against product-producing companies to obtain licensing revenue. 208 The largest aggregator,
Intellectual Ventures, has held as many as 30,000 to 60,000
patents.'09 Imagine a patent aggregator who holds a small number
of patents related to the automobile industry but well below the
threshold one would normally consider sufficient to confer power in
the automotive IP market. 210 Given the cost of evaluating a large
205. For a discussion of different terminology used, see Feldman, supra note 191, at 244-54.
206. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 79, § 4.03[A]; see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) (explaining that patents do not necessarily confer monopoly power).
207. For a discussion of blocking patents, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1007-13 (1997); Robert
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 79-80 (1994).
208. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TEcH. L. REV. 1, 1.
209. See id. at 1, 3-4 (tracing shell corporations of Intellectual Ventures and anslyzing
impact on market theories).
210. See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 58, at 304 (setting out the

aggregator and automobile industry hypothetical); see also Memorandum from Robin
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number of patents, let alone the cost of litigating patent by patent,
a rational company may well choose to pay a license fee for the
portfolio as a whole, even if the company's activities are unlikely to
violate all or even very many of the patents asserted. 211 If numerous
companies in the automobile industry follow the same rational
calculation by choosing to pay, and if prices rise in the industry
beyond a reasonable return on investment, the aggregator may have
succeeded in impacting prices and consumer welfare without
holding any power in the market for automobiles. 212
In a more extreme example, suppose the aggregator holds no
patents in the automobile industry at all. 213 Nevertheless, the aggregator asserts a few patents from an unrelated industry, along with
a threat to keep lobbing patent assertions at the automobile
manufacturer. Once again, automobile companies could conclude
that the rational choice is to buy a license to the portfolio. Thus, an
aggregator merely needs a sufficiently sized patent portfolio,
perhaps combined with a reputation for aggressive litigation, to
have an impact on an industry. Market power in the markets as
traditionally defined is not necessary. Rather, the power comes from
the synergistic effects of lower levels of power in multiple IP
markets when the use of multiple different components is necessary
to make a product work.
We also see the synergistic effects of an action involving multiple markets in the operation of volume rebates in health plan
Feldman, Professor ofL., Univ. Cal. Hastings Coli. of the L., to David J. Kappos, Under Sec'y
of Com. for Intell. Prop. & Dir. of the USPTO, at 5-6 (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.uspto.gov/
sitesldefault/files/patentsllaw/com.m.ents/rpii-f_feldman_l30125.pdf [https:l/perm.a.cc/AXVS-

EBZQ].
211. See Gideon Parchom.ovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
31-32 (2005) (noting the additive effects of asserting multiple patents). Large portfolio owners
like IBM rarely end up having to enforce their patents, for the simple reason that defending
against an IBM case is a fool's errand-even if you defeat the particular patents, there are
always more it can assert. For in-depth analyses of patent aggregators, see Ewing & Feldman,
supra note 208; Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 58; Robin C. Feldman &
Mark A. Lemley, The Sound and Fury of Patent Activity, 103 MINN. L. REv. 1793 (2019).
212. See 1 HOVENKAMPET AL., supra note 79, § 4.02[A]. But most patents don't confer any
practical power because they have substitutes. See id. § 4.03[A]. Nonetheless, unlike a product

market, where there can be only one monopolist, many patent owners can each control a
market with a sufficiently strong patent or portfolio because each patent gives its owner the
right to exclude others from making the product at all. See id. § 4.02[A].
213. Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 58, at 304.
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reimbursement.' 14 In modern health plans, medication coverage is
dictated by the plan's formulary, which is divided into tiers. 215 These
tiers determine how much a patient will have to pay out of pocket
to access a drug, if the drug is covered by the plan. 216 In theory,
these tiers should promote generic and low-cost branded drugs over
more expensive alternatives. But it hasn't worked out that way.
Formulary tiers can be loosely analogized to product placement
in a grocery store.'17 A candy company may sell more candy if its
product is placed at eye level at the checkout counter than if it is
placed on the top shelf of the snack section!'" In the pharmaceutical
world, brand companies provide a monetary incentive in the form of
a rebate to drug payors-including insurers, managed care organizations, and pharmaceutical benefit managers-to provide a better
placement on the formulary than their competitors, or even to
exclude competitors entirely. 219 These incentives are often offered in
exchange for ensuring a particular volume of the product or a
particular percentage of relevant patients within a plan. 220 Without
these rebate incentives, and in a market of sharply rising prices, the
health plan and its patients would be forced to pay the extraordinarily high list price.'21
The power to create volume rebates comes through the operation
of an expiring patent monopoly.'22 When a drug's patents expire,
generic entrants should be poised to jump into the market. The
brand company can prevent or delay that transition through volume
discount deals coupled with an exclusivity requirement. 223 Imagine
214. Although volume rebates can be part of a multi-actioned strategy, they can also
operate as single behavior exploiting synergistic effects across multiple markets. For an indepth description offormulary tiering and the impact of volume rebates, see Feldman, supra

note 176.
215. See id. at 3.
216. See id.
217. ld. at 11. If anything, the analogy only undersells the harm of formulary manipulation, for-unlike shelf space-formularies need not be subject to physical limits at all.

218. See Valdi.m.ar Sigurdsson, Hugi Saevarsson & Gordon Foxall, Brand Placement and
Consumer Choice: An In-Store Experiment, 42 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 741, 743 (2009).
219. See Feldman, supra note 176, at 13-15.
220. See FELDMAN, supra note 176, at 20-21.
221. See Feldman, supra note 176, at 53-56 (showing higher list prices than post-rebate

prices in Medicare).
222. See id. at 15.

223. See id. In the pharmaceutical realm, as opposed to beer bottles, requirements
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if Budweiser made the following offer to bar owners in an area 224 : I
will give you $1 back on every $3 bottle of Budweiser that you sell
if you don't put any of that craft beer on the menu. If the bars
currently sell40,000 bottles of Budweiser in a year, that deal would
be worth $40,000. Now imagine a craft beer company trying to break
into the market and currently selling 1,000 bottles a year at a list
price of $3. If the craft beer discounted its beer down to the tiny
price of a penny a bottle, it still couldn't compete. The roughly
$3,000 discount the bar owner gets could not compensate for the
$40,000 discount the bar owner would forgo by walking away from
Budweiser's deal.
Now imagine volume rebates operating across multiple markets.
Brand companies have created bundled rebate programs in which
the desirable rebate comes only if the health plan chooses all of the
company's drugs in a category of drugs to the exclusion of other
competitors. In this manner, a company can use the power of a
volume position in one market to block competition in another
market in which the company faces competition. As one Medicare
plan administrator explained in discussing the bundled discount
program for the blockbuster eye medication Restasis, the new
entrant could give its drug away for free and the numbers still
wouldn't work. 226
contracts may be framed not as demanding total exclusivity but as a percentage of needs in
an area. The goal of total exclusivity may be too expensive, and limiting the cheaper competitor's footing in the market may be sufficient.
224. See FELDMAN, supra note 176, at 22-23, 28-29 (using the beer analogy to describe
volume discounts and explaining characteristics of the pharmaceutical market that make
volume discounts more anticompetitive than in markets such as technology).
225. See Complaint at 67, 21-23, Shire US, Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 538
(D.N.J. 2019) (No. 17-7716); cf. Complaint at 4-5. Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F.
Supp. 3d 494 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No.17-4180) (alleging Johnson & Johnson used anticompetitive
bundled rebate scheme to block emerging biosimilar competitor to its rheumatoid arthritis
drug, Remicade); Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement, Approval
of the Proposed Manner and Form of Notice, and Appointment of Escrow Agent and Settlement Administrator at 2, Castro, M.D., P A v. Sanofi. Pasteur Inc., No. 11-7178, LEXIS 96001
(D.N .J. 2012); Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement, Approval
of the Proposed Manner and Form of Notice, and Appointment of Escrow Agent and
Settlement Administrator at 2, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., No. 11·7178 (D.N.J. flied Apr.
24, 2017); Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approving Plan of
Distribution and Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal at 1-6, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc.,
No. 11-7178 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 23, 2017) ($61.5 million settlement in case alleging that under
Sanofi.'s bundled discount scheme, the company charged up to 34.5 percent more for its
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The bargaining power granted by the brand-name company's
monopoly creates additional coercive power as well. Consumers and
doctors may initially be reluctant to switch to a generic, and it may
take some time for the transition to occur. The generic company also
may not be prepared to provide the entire volume of supply from the
first moment. In both circumstances, the health plan is dependent
on the brand-name company for the necessary drugs for its patients.
That dependence provides additional coercive power to drive purchasers to branded drugs by insisting on exclusivity--{)nce again
flowing from a government-granted monopoly that has already
expired. 226 In short, with bundled pharmaceutical rebates, a company can use its combined market power across multiple markets
to disadvantage a competitor entering a single market. Unfortunately, courts have permitted such conduct even when it has clearly
anticompetitive consequences. 227
With multiple markets in the pharmaceutical space, the seeds of
potential approaches can be found within various decisions, but all
ofthem place limits on the behaviors that can be reached, and none
recognize the need to think broadly about synergistic effects across
markets. For example, the Third Circuit in the 1978 SmithKline
Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co. decision held that a bundled discount pricing scheme in the market for cephalosporin antibiotics constituted
willful maintenance of a monopoly. 228 The Third Circuit agreed
with the district court's characterization of the case,"29 which
pediatric meningitis vaccine, Menactra, unless buyers agreed to purchase all of the company's
vaccines exclusively).

226. Formulary tiering manipulations such as these can have a significant impact on
generic competitors, not to mention patients and society. For example, Feldman recently
studied health insurance tiering by examining all retail prescription claims for a cohort of one
million Medicare patients between 2010-2017. See Feldman, supra note 176, at 22-23. The
results show that the percentage of generics on the most preferred tier-the tier with lowest
costs for consumers--dropped from 73 percent to 28 percent over the eight-year period. See
id. Similarly, the percentage of drugs that were inappropriately tiered rose from 4 7 percent
to 7 4 percent. See id. at 26. Considering only costs paid by patients and the federal low-income
subsidy program, tier misplacement cumulatively cost society $13.25 billion during this time.
See id. at 28.
227. See In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Antitrust Litig.,
507 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (D. Kan. 2020) (granting summary judgment in favor ofMylan, which
enabled outrageous price increases for epinephrine by paying pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs) to refuse to carry competing products).
228. See 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978).
229. Seeid.
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included the notion that one may not link a market in which one
holds monopoly power with a competitive market to repel those
trying to enter the competitive market. 230
The case involved bundled discounts, however, and later decisions
have similarly involved bundling schemes that include one product
holding market power. 231 In the same vein, the leading antitrust law
treatise suggests that bundled discounts are better analyzed as
tying arrangements. 232 In Eli Lilly, however, when faced with a
tying claim in addition to the attempted monopolization claim, the
court declined to find tying.••• The judge reasoned that the buyers
were free to reject the deal, even though they could suffer significant
financial consequences. 234 According to this logic, which is echoed in
other tying analyses, as long as buyers are not forced to accept the
deal, no tying can exist. 235 This rather constrained definition of
"forcing'' defies common sense. Freedom to commit economic suicide
is an illusory freedom, at best. 236
230. See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd,
575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978). As described below, tbe court in Eli Lilly declined to fmd tying
in this case on the grounds that the buyers were not forced but were free to tum down the
deal and suffer the financial consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 279-80.
231. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003).
232. See 10 PHILLIP E.AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ~ 1758 (3d ed. 2011).
233. Eli Lilly, 427 F. Supp. at 1114.
234. Seeid.
235. See Waldo v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. 669 F. Supp. 722, 728-29 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (re·
jecting plaintiff's claim that defendant tied the sale of insurance to its sale of trucks where

plaintiff acknowledged he was free to purchase insurance from another party, but lacked the
funds to do so, such that there was no evidence of coercion); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F.

Supp. 2d 568, 576-80 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (rejecting four claims of tying where farm supplier
defendants failed to establish that any of the seed-producer plaintiff's programs "forced"
farmers to buy its products), aff'd and remanded, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
236. Predatory pricing behavior exists when a dominant fmn charges below cost, drives
other competitors out of the market, and then raises prices to monopolistic levels. Believing
predatory pricing to be the appropriate lens for analyzing complex rebate schemes, some
cases and commentators suggest that anticompetitive rebate behavior exists only when a
monopolist charges a price below cost. See, e.g., Aaron R. Moore, Note, Anticompetitive
Bundled Discounts: A WayOutofthe Wilderness, 37 J.CORP.L. 951,960-67 (2012) (analyzing
various proposed frameworks for determining liability in bundled discount cases); see also
Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaoeHealtb, 515 F.3d 883, 903, 909 (9tb Cir. 2008) (requiring a
showing of predatory pricing but easing the requirement slightly by attributing the total
discount to the tied product); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993) (explaining the requirements of predatory pricing); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION CcMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 (2007) [hereinafter AMC REPCRT]
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More important, a tying analysis requires market power in the
tying market. 237 If a branded drug company no longer holds any
power in the relevant markets but simply relies on its combined
volume of patients-some of whom will surely be captive--and the
pressure of high prices, a tying analysis becomes more challenging.
Some litigants have tried to argue that when volume discounts
are part of a scheme to move patients from an old version of a drug
to a new version, the behavior can only violate antitrust law if the
brand company charges below its cost for the drug. 238 In other
(summarizingtheAMC's recommendation for a modified discount attribution test for bundled
discounts). As one author observes, however, there are a number of flaws with including
bundled discount cases in the predatory pricing mold. See Sean P. Gates, Antitrust by
Analogy: Developing Rules for Loyalty Rebates and Bundled Discounts, 79 ANTITRUSTL.J. 99,
122-26 (2013). For example, given economic realities, cross-market leverages exist and can
be used to harm competition. ld. Most importantly, the predatory pricing framework fails in
markets with high fiXed costs and low variable costs or in which incumbents need not drive
competitors fully out of the market to entrench market power. See, e.g., Meijer, Inc. v. Abbott
Lab'ys, 544 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004-05 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (declining to apply Cascade where
above-cost pricing could still exclude even more efficient manufacturers); FELDMAN, supra
note 176, at 21-26 (discussing the effects of volume rebates in modern pharmaceutical
markets).
237. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 527 U.S. 28, 37 (2006).
238. In In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochlorine and Naloxone) Antitrust Litigation,
direct purchasers ofSuboxone, a prescription drug used to treat opioid addiction, alleged that
the drug manufacturer engaged in a product hopping scheme to force patients to use a film
formulation of Suboxone instead of a tablet form as the exclusivity period for the tablet form
neared its end. 967 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 2020). After the district court granted plaintiffs'
motion for class certification, the manufacturer appealed, arguing in part that plaintiffs failed
to provide "common evidence of injury or damages that matches a viable theory of liability,"
as required to demonstrate predominance. See id. at 270 (footnote omitted). The manufacturer
argued that plaintiffs• only evidence of common injury was that they paid more than they
otherwise would have due to the manufacturer's decision to raise the prices of Suboxone
tablets, and that plaintiffs' damages claim was premised on the manufacturer's choice to
lower the prices of Suboxone film, causing plaintiffs to buy more film and fewer generic
tablets. See id. The manufacturer asserted that the alleged injuries and damages resulted
from lawful conduct in that ''unilaterally pricing a new product lower than an older product,
but still above cost, is perfectly legal." See Brief for Defendant-Appellant lndivior, Inc. at 11
(under seal), In re Sub=ne, 967 F.3d 264 (No.l9-3640).
The Third Circuit did not directly address these arguments. instead looking beyond the
manufacturer's pricing of tablets to
the totality of [the manufacturer's] actions, such as raising prices, withdrawing
tablets from the market, providing rebates only for film, disparaging the safety
of tablets. and delaying the generics' entry by filing a citizen petition and not
cooperating in the REMS process, suppressed generic competition and thus
violat[ing] the antitrust laws.
In re Suboxone, 967 F.3d at 270. The court explained that the manufacturer ''incorrectly asks
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words, these patterns of behavior would be acceptable unless they
constitute predatory pricing, in which a company drives the price for
a product down to such a low level that the competitor is forced to
leave the market, at which point the predator raises the prices skyhigh to recoup its losses."39 It would make little sense, however, to
analyze pharmaceutical rebates in terms of recoupment. These
types of behaviors are not focused on recouping temporary losses.
Rather, they are schemes to prevent something from happening-specifically, to prevent the unfolding of the Hatch-Waxman
system for robust generic competition.
Finally, even in the realm of multiplicity of markets, one must not
forget the Noerr constraints. 240 A pharmaceutical company's volume
rebate schemes, for example, may be combined with other behaviors
such as citizen petitions or evergreening-behaviors that would
involve petitions to a judicial or regulatory body. Under those circumstances, Noerr's protections for petitioning government, in their
current form, provide a poor fit for analyzing the synergistic effects
of the scheme as a whole.
Ill. CLEARING A PATH

More than any other area oflaw, antitrust is supposed to focus on
the economic realities of markets. But as we have seen, all too often
modern antitrust law replaces a holistic look at competitive effects
with blinkered attention to the provable consequences of a single act
isolated from context.
It wasn't supposed to be this way, and it wasn't always this way.
Antitrust doctrine already has many of the tools it needs to focus on
the forest and not the trees, from the "incipiency" doctrine in the
Clayton Act to those Noerr-Pennington decisions that focus on a
us to examine each of these acts individually," when the court must look at "all the acts taken
together [to determine whether they] show the willful acquisition or maintenance of a
monopoly." Id. (quoting Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 813 (3d
Cir. 1984)). The court found common evidence existed to prove the plaintiffs' antitrust theory
and the resulting injury because the evidence would be used to show that the manufacturer's
actions occurred and the actions taken together suppressed generic competition. ld. at 271.
239. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212-18
(1993) (establishing the below-cost-pricing-plus-recoupment test in a predatory pricing case).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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pattern of conduct rather than the success of individual lawsuits.
Courts and agencies can, therefore, put existing antitrust tools to
better use, focusing not just on proven harms to competition but on
the probabilistic reduction of competition and on anticompetitive
synergies.
But there is more we can and should do. In this Part, we suggest
additional steps courts, the enforcement agencies, or Congress could
take to solve the problem of atomistic antitrust.
A. Too Big to Buy

First, we need to reinvigorate merger enforcement. Agencies and
courts have permitted mergers that threaten undue concentration
in certain industries, and indeed have even allowed mergers that
further concentrate industries that are already too concentrated. 241
They have also permitted dominant firms to acquire smaller companies.242 Those deals harm competition by increasing prices,
reducing innovation, and entrenching dominant firms. 243 They may
also facilitate collusion. 244
We should create a presumption of anticompetitive harm from
acquisitions by monopolists or any firm with a significant market
share (say, over 40 percent), essentially reversing the burden of
responding to uncertainty about the effects of a merger. Doing so
would solve a number of problems in current law.
First, it would relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving that a
particular merger would lead to competitive harm; above a certain
threshold it would become the merging parties' burden to rebut the
241. STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM., & ADMIN. L., 116TH CONG., REP. ON
INVESTIGATION OF CoMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 400·02 (Comm. Print 2020).
242. See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 4-5; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 85, at
1880-81; STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM., &ADMIN. L., 116TH CoNG., supra note
241, at 11.
243. See STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM., ANDAD:MIN. L., 116TH CONG., supra
note 241, at 11-12, 18.
244. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FrC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that a
concentration-increasing merger among hospitals in Chattanooga, Tennessee increased the
likelihood of coordination leading to lower output and higher prices that might both be
difficult to separately challenge). As Judge Posner noted, "Section 7 does not require proof
that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market. All that
is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of [competitive harm] in the
future," a standard that calls for a probabilistic prediction rather than proof. See id. at 1389.
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presumption that their merger would harm competition. It therefore sidesteps the extreme causation requirements modern courts
have put on antitrust plaintiffs. As Doug Melamed notes, "[c]urrent
law implicitly presumes that mergers are efficient .... Plaintiffs are
therefore required to prove that increased market power is a likely
result of the merger. That is an almost impossible task." 246 But
where the industry is already concentrated, we shouldn't put that
"impossible" burden on the government agencies challenging the
merger. Dominant firms should have to justify allowing them to buy
companies that might threaten their dominance. Traditional merger
doctrine focused on the problem of entrenching existing monopolies
and was therefore particularly restrictive of mergers in already
concentrated markets.'46 We think that is sound antitrust policy.'47
Second, a presumption would avoid the problem of mergers flying
under the radar. The presumption would extend to acquisitions of
startups worth less than $200 million (the current threshold for
reporting mergers for antitrust review). This would require
amending the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold to require
reporting of smaller mergers when the acquirer is a dominant
firm.' 48 Right now those mergers don't even trigger government
review.'49 But they may short-circuit an important source of future
competition. 260 And there is even evidence that companies structure
245. A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law and Its Critics, 83 ANTITRUSTL.J. 269, 278 (2020).
246. Portions ofthis Section are adapted from Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 96-98.
For a discussion, see Sean P. Sullivan, Anticompetitive Entrenchment, 68 U. KAN. L. REv.
1133, 1135-36 (2020).
247. As Herb Hovenkamp notes:
While antitrust is powerless to regulate a single firm's prices, it can interdict a
merger that is li.k.ely to put the firm into a position where it is able profitably to
increase its prices above the competitive level. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113
F. Supp. 3d 1, 62·64 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding merger would eliminate bidding
competition between closest competitors, thus permitting post-merger firm
unilaterally to increaae its price); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F.

Supp. 2d 36, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2011) (reasoning similarly, although ultimately
concluding that analysis of unilateral effects was unnecessary).
Hovenkamp, supra note 47, at 57 & n.60.
248. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 97; see also FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note

112, at 12. We are not suggesting that tbe Hart-Scott-Rodino threshold be lowered overall.

Many acquisitions by nondominant firms or in other industries do not raise the concerns we
identify here. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 97 n.419.
249. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 112, at 12.
250. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 20-22.
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their transactions to avoid government scrutiny. 261 We think that
the antitrust agencies should presumptively block dominant firms'
acquisitions of directly competitive startups. 262
Third, a presumption avoids the complication that many startup
acquisitions are not of direct competitors. 253 Antitrust law is more
skeptical of "horizontal mergers" between competitors than of
251. Cunningham eta!., supra note 112, at 653, 685-87.
An interesting recent example is Facebook's acquisition of Giphy, which was apparently
preceded by an effort to artif'J.cially lower Giphy's valuation to bring the transaction under the
U.S. review threshold. See Katie Canales, The Sneaky Way Face book Reportedly Got Its $400
Million Giphy Acquisition Under Regulawry Radar Is Completely Legal, Experts Say, Bus.
INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2021, 12:08 PM), https:l/www.businessinsider.com/giphy-facebook-divi
dends-payment-deal-antitrust-2021-8 [https://perma.cci65BN-TUWX]. The UK has since challenged the merger. Katharine Gemmell, Meta Must Sell Giphy on U.K Antitrust Worries in
Big Tech Blow, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 30, 2021, 9:23AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.coml
antitrustlm.eta-must-sell-giphy-on-competition-concems-u-k-says [https://perma.cc18BBWZTXP].
252. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 97. Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu argue that a
dominant firm's acquisition or exclusion of a nascent competitor should be prohibited. See
Hemphill & Wu, supra note 85, at 1881; cf. C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents:
Platform Competition in an. Age of Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1981-83
(2019) (discussing the role that adjacent incumbents can play in challenging a market); Kevin
A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U.
Cm. L.REV. 331, 333-34 (2020) (suggesting that we reverse the presumption that the market
will self-correct when an incumbent buys a startup); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital
Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1553 (2019) (same). For an effort to distinguish good from
bad acquisitions of nascent competitors, see John M. Yun, Are We Dropping the Crystal Ball?
Understanding Nascent & Potential Competition in Antitrust, 104 MARQ. L. REv. 613, 657-58
(2021). For a suggestion along similar lines but focused on vertical rather than horizontal or
adjacent mergers, see Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710,
731-36 (2017). As she describes:
A stricter approach would place prophylactic limits on vertical integration by
platforms that have reached a certain level of dominance. This would recognize
that a platform's involvement across multiple related lines ofbusiness can give
rise to conflicts of interest by creating circumstances in which a platform has an
incentive to privilege its own business and disadvantage other companies.
Seeking to prevent the industry structures that create these conflicts of interest
may prove more effective than policing these conflicts. Adopting this prophylactic approach would mean banning a dominant firm from entering any
market that it already serves as a platform-in other words, from competing
directly with the businesses that depend on it.
Id. at 793 (footnotes omitted). Khan has since developed this proposal further, suggesting a
"separation regime" limiting merger "only if a dominant platform that controlled a key
distribution channel or marketplace sought to acquire a firm that would compete in that
marketplace." LinaM. Khan, The Separation ofPlatforms and Commerce, 119 CoLUM. L. REv.
973, 1087 (2019)_
253. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 85, at 1880-81, 1907.
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''vertical mergers" combining buyers and sellers in a supply chain
or "conglomerate mergers" that link unrelated businesses.' 54 But
how should we analyze two technologies that aren't related but
might become so? Things that interconnect and work together but
do different things? Traditional antitrust doctrines have trouble
assessing mergers like these. 255 Acquiring a direct competitor limits
competition in the existing market. But acquiring adjacent companies short-circuits the Schumpeterian competition that could wholly
displace the incumbent.'56
Agencies should pay particular attention to acquisitions by
incumbent monopolists, even if they don't present as direct competitors. Acquisitions of adjacent firms are likely to increase concentration and prevent the development of fundamentally new sources of
competition. And unlike mergers between small firms, which might
help build a strong competitor to an incumbent, acquisitions of
adjacent startups by an incumbent often reinforce and extend its
dominance, not only preventing a new competitor from arising but
also making it harder for other competitors to dislodge the incumbent.'57
Things are more complicated if the startup doesn't compete directly with the incumbent. Acquisition of a truly unrelated firm is
unlikely to do much competitive harm (though it also won't offer any
great benefits)."58 And acquisitions of complementary firms can
sometimes enhance efficiency by linking complementary products
more closely or by giving a nascent technology a wider distribution
platform."59 So we shouldn't ban all acquisitions by incumbents.'60
254. See Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Recent Developments and Economic Teachings, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2019, at 1, 5-7. For skepticism of
this more favorable treatment, see generally Marissa Beck & Fiona Scott Morton, Evaluating
the Evidence on Vertical Mergers, 59 REv. INDus. ORG. 273 (2021). The antitrust agencies
recently issued revised vertical merger guidelines that take the competitive risks more
seriously. U.S. DEFT OF JUST. & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2020), https ://www .ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_sta tements/1561 715/
p810034verticalmergerguidelinesdraft.pdf [https://perma.cdLF34-8JKY].
255. See Yun, supra note 252, at 626-28.
256. See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 8-9.
257. ld. at 96-97.
258. ld. at 98.
259. Id. (discussing these potential benefits). That said, claims to synergy from mergers are
regularly overstated. Scott A Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where
Mergers Go Wrong, McKINSEYQ., May 2004, https:/lwww.mcki.nsey.com/business-functions/
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At the same time, much of the potential harm from acquisitions
comes not in the form of suppressing direct competition but in
accreting complementary technologies and shutting down potentially disruptive alternatives_ 261 Currently the law pays little, if any,
attention to noncompetitive mergers involving startups_ 262 We need
a much greater focus on mergers that involve adjacent or potentially
market-disrupting technologies. 268 The presumption should be weaker for firms that don't directly compete. 264 Sometimes acquisitions
of complementary technologies by dominant firms can improve
efficiency, clear blocking patents, or give the acquired firm a bigger
platform for its products. 265 It could also be rebutted by strong
evidence that the startup's technology is uniquely complementary
to the incumbent's, so that it is unlikely to be profitably deployed by
anyone other than the incumbent. 266 The presumption could also be
rebutted if the acquirer could show that the purchase improved
competition in some way that outweighed any potential competitive
harm.'67 We think it unlikely there are many such cases. Ordinary
claims of efficiencies from reducing duplication won't cut it. They
strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/where-mergers-go-wrong [https://perma.cc/7BEZG6QJ]. The e:lireiencies defense rarely ends up making the difference in merger cases, in part
because too few challenges succeed in presenting a prima facie case. Herbert Hovenkamp,
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MAsoN L. REV. 703 (2017). And economists have
suggested that mergers reduce innovation, both by the merging companies and overall. Giulio
Federico, Gregor Langus & Tommaso V alletti, A Simple Model ofMergers and Innovation, 157
ECON. LETTERS 136, 139 (2017).
260. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 98.
261. Id.
262. For a detailed discussion of this fact and why it's a mistake, see Kevin A Bryan &
Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 616, 616
(2020); Bryan & Hovenka.m.p, supra note 252, at 331.
263. Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech
Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. EcoN. PERSPS. 69, 78 (2019) C'[A]gencies and the courts could
express greater wariness when a dominant incumbent firm seeks to acquire a firm operating
in an adjacent market, especially if the target firm is well positioned to challenge the incumbent's position in the foreseeable future.").
264. See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 85, at 98.
265. See id. (discussing these potential benefits).
266. For example, a company that developed an add-on specific to Microsoft Word might
be valuable only to Microsoft.
This exception will be hard to prove. That's by design. We don't want the exception to swallow the rule. Investors who don't think they'll be able to make that argument of complementarity won't buy that startup. Corporations may have to do more innovation in-house. Id.
at 98 n.425.
267. See Melamed, supra note 85.
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would have to involve some unique synergy that the startup couldn't
achieve either on its own or through a merger with another firm.
And even if the merger does create such a synergy, antitrust
authorities should probably impose conduct remedies like a
requirement that the merged firm open the synergistic new technology to others. In any event, we shouldn't effectively ignore those
acquisitions, as we do today. Nor should we accept claims of
efficiencies or benefits without very strong evidence.
The presumption against mergers in concentrated markets should
also be rebuttable if (1) the startup would not be viable as a freestanding entity and (2) there are no other plausible acquirers (a
nondominant company willing to pay a reasonable price, even if
lower than the incumbent would pay). 268 But those standards should
be strictly applied. Not every firm that claims to be failing actually
is. Not every firm that is actually failing should be bought. And not
every failing firm that should be bought should be bought by the
incumbent. Unfortunately, courts are too often willing to allow
mergers based on unsubstantiated claims that the target is floundering.269
This is not to suggest that big is bad or that a monopolist cannot
continue to innovate. Homegrown innovation-that is, innovation
in one's own lab-would be perfectly acceptable. Buying one's way
to continued dominance, however, raises the specter of allowing
monster-sized companies to strangle future competitors before they
leave the cradle.
B. Banning Noncompetes

Second, we should ban noncompetes. The evidence is overwhelming that they reduce employee mobility, depress wages, and

268. This is consistent with the traditional understanding of the "failing firm" defense to
mergers in antitrust law. That defense requires proof that a company (1) is in danger of
imminent business failure, (2) cannot reorganize successfully in bankruptcy, and (3) made
unsuccessful good faith efforts to fmd alternative purchasers. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Fl'C, 280
u.s. 291, 301 (1930).
269. See Bryan Koenig, Enforcers Remain Worried About 'Flailing' Merger Arguments, LAW
360 (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1354352/enforcers-remain-worriedabout-flailing-merger-arguments [https:l/perma.cc/YGSE-NNCV].
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limit innovation. 270 They are particularly problematic when applied
to minimum wage workers and others at the low end of the labor
market, because they reinforce the effective power employers have
to prevent a truly competitive labor market by denying workers a
choice of jobs. 271
Congress could ban noncompetes altogether, as a growing number
of states have done. 272 The government could also discourage noncompetes by refusing to contract with companies that use them even
in states in which they are legal. 273 But antitrust can also play a role
without a need for legislation. The California law banning noncompetes uses language resembling section 1 of the Sherman Act. 274
And California courts have refused every attempt to read in a "rule
of reason'' or other limitations to that language. 275 Using this
interpretation as precedent, the Antitrust Division could leverage
the language in section 1 of the Sherman Act to ban employment
noncompetes nationwide, either altogether or in circumstances in
which they most clearly restrain competition, such as in concentrated markets or for low-wage or unskilled workers. 276
The FTC and the DOJ's Antitrust Division have only recently
started to consider anticompetitive practices in the labor market to
be within their scope of regulating competition and unfair trade
practices. 277 That the White House has recently encouraged the
Commission to consider banning noncompetes is certainly a
270. Seaman, supra note 138, at 1186 (discussing studies).
271. On the problem of labor market monopsony, see generally Buresh Naidu, Eric A.
Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 IIARv. L. REv. 536
(2018).
272. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH & RoBERT P.
MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PRoPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020, at 120·21 (2020).
273. LEMLEY & LoBEL, supra note 132.
274. Compare CAL. Bus. &PRoF. CoDE§ 16600 (West 2021) (voiding any portion of a con·
tract that "restrain[s]" a person's ability to engage in lawful employment), with 15 U.S.C. § 1
(deeming unlawful agreements ''in restraint oftradej.
275. See, e.g., Edwards v. Artbur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290, 297 (Cal. 2008).
276. Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non-Compete Clauses, OPENMKTS.INsT.
(Mar. 20, 2019), https:l/static1.squarespace.com/static/5e449c8c3ef68d752f3e70dc/t/5esa0486
2ff52116d1dd04cli1588200595775/Petition·for·Rulemaking·to·Probibit·Worker·Nan·CompeteClauses.pdf [https:l/perma.cc/LP2S-VX5K].
277. This paragraph is adapted from LEMLEY & LoBEL, supra note 132, at 7. For
information on these anticompetitive practices, see U.S. DEF'T OF JUST. & U.S. FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PRoFESSIONALS 2 (2016), https:l/www.
justice.govlatrlfile/9035111download [https:llperma.cc/V2LM-7LE3].
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promising sign. 278 But so far the FTC has taken no action. The FTC
could use its regulatory power under section 5 of the FTC Act's
prohibition on "unfair methods of competition" 279 to issue a federal
rule to ban noncompetes nationwide in appropriate circumstances.280 The FTC could enforce this rule by bringing action
against employers who use, or seek to use, noncompetes to restrict
employee mobility in ways that interfere with competition.
C. Consider Markets and Conduct as a Whole

Third, courts should be more open to considering a pattern of
anticompetitive conduct that crosses traditional market boundaries
and that includes conduct that is not illegal standing alone. As we
have seen, companies can interfere with competition by taking
actions to target a single defendant in multiple markets, 281 by
taking actions against multiple defendants,'"' and by taking a
variety of acts against a single defendant.'"" An atomistic focus on
one act against one competitor in one market must give way to a
broader focus on the overall effects of a company's behavior, even
when that behavior is directed at different defendants or different
markets.
We don't necessarily need to change the law to achieve many of
these results. We can make significant progress simply by applying
the law on the books. Courts can find liability based on an overall
scheme to monopolize even if not all of the acts in that scheme are
independently wrongful,' 84 and some courts emphasize that we
278. Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,992 (Jul. 9, 2021) (''To address
agreements that may unduly limit workers' ability to change jobs, the Chair of the FTC is
encouraged to consider working with the rest of the Commission to exercise the FTC's statutoryrulemaking authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to curtail the unfair use
of non-compete clauses and other clauses or agreements that may unfairly limit worker

mobility.j.

279. 15 U .S.C. § 45. For more on this precedent, see FI'C v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 454 (1986); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
280. OPENMKTS. INBT., supra note 276.
281. See supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing patent aggregators).
282. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing startup mergers and
patterns of lawsuits).
283. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (discussing pharmaceutical
evergreening using a variety of practices).
284. There must, of course, be some wrongful conduct.
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shouldn't break allegations into their individual components.""
Some (but as we have seen, not all) 286 courts are willing to consider
a pattern of abusive litigation or regulatory petitioning even if some
of the individual lawsuits are protected petitioning activity.'87 The
Supreme Court has blessed the practice, 288 but courts have wavered
in applying antitrust scrutiny to the cumulative effects of several
actions!"" Similarly, some-but not all--courts will find antitrust
286. "[T]he law requires that the 'character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged
by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole."' In
re Nat1 Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1152 (9tb Cir. 2019)
(quoting Cont1 Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698-99 (1962)). "[W]e
must give plaintiffs 'the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the
various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each."• ld. at 1152-53

(quoting City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1989),
opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 886 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1989)). As such, even if every

individual act in isolation produced no anticompetitive effect, they may still comprise an
unlawful scheme where the acts collectively "work[] in tandem ... to restrain competition." Id.

at 1153;seealsoNewYorkexrel. Schneiderman v.Actavis PLC, 787F.3d638, 653-54(2dCir.
2016) (combination of acts may be anticompetitive even though "neither [individual act] alone
is anticompetitive'); Abbott Lab'ys v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 428 (D.
Del. 2006) ("Plaintiffs are entitled to claim that ... acts as a group have an anticompetitive
effect even if the acts taken separately do not."); Simon & Simon, PC v. Align Tech., 533 F.

Supp. 3d 904, 908 (N.D. Cal. AprilS, 2021) ("[A]lthough not every aspect of the alleged scheme
gives rise to an antitrust claim on its own, the totality of the conduct does.'').
286. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

287. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat1 Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2000); USSPOSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Const. Trades Counril, 31 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 1994).
288. Cont1 Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 698-99 t1t is apparent from the foregoing that the Court
of Appeals approached Continental's claims as if they were five completely separate and

unrelated lawsuits. We think this was improper. In cases such as this, plaintiffs should be
given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual
components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each.'').
289. Compare City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1980)
("The utility would have us consider each separate aspect of its conduct separately and in a
vacuum. If we did, we might agree with the utility that no one aspect standing alone is illegal.
It is the mix of the various ingredients of utility behavior in a monopoly broth that produces
the unsavory flavor.'), with City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 928-29
(2d Cir. 1981) ("Even though many of the issues the municipalities raise are interrelated and
interdependent, however, we must, like the municipalities' briefs, analyze the various issues
individually. Moreover, we reject the notion that if there is a fraction of validity to each of the
basic claims and the sum of the fractions is one or more, the plaintiffs have proved a violation
of section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act.'), andlntergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d

1346, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (refusing to "add up" pieces of evidence each supporting

independent theories of antitrust liability); Daniel A Crane, Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad
Soup?, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 663, 666-70 (2010) (criticizing the combination of conduct to show
monopoly).
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liability for conduct by a monopolist that is "reasonably capable of
contributing significantly to" monopolization. 290 Simply applying
that law faithfully would be a good start.
In other areas, we may need more change. Courts have become
hidebound with market definition-for example, ignoring other
evidence of market-power-like conduct that makes no sense without
power and persistent evidence of prices in excess of marginal cost.""'
The antitrust agencies have moved away from an exclusive focus on
market definition; 292 hopefully the courts will eventually follow
suit."93 If they don't, Congress could step in to reiterate what the
Sherman Act originally made clear-anticompetitive conduct by
monopolists is unlawful even if the harm it does is not in a tightly
defined market it shares with the defendant.
Courts are also reluctant to punish a defendant for engaging in
conduct that is legal standing alone, even if it is done as part of a
pattern of activity designed to restrain competition. There is room
for courts to target those overall schemes to monopolize under
existing law, but Congress could also act to directly target some of
the more common ways defendants restrain competition. Congress
could pass legislation to crack down on some of the regulatory
abuses that are rampant in the pharmaceutical industry-for
instance, forbidding certain practices, limiting the aggregate regulatory delay permissible, or limiting the number of patents a
monopolist could assert covering a given drug." 94
We could also make patents harder to get and enforce. Limitations on the USPTO's ability to review every claim of every patent
290. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en bane); S. Pac.
Commc'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 999 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Contra Rambus
v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
291. Kaplow. supra note 18, at 1309-10, 1346. For examples, see Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F. 3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
292. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FEo. TEADE CoMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGEE GUIDEIJNES 7-8
(2010).
293. For some encouraging evidence, see Carl Shapiro & Howard Shelanski, Judicial
Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 58 REv. INDUS. ORG. 51, 53, 60, 78(2021).
294. See, e.g., Feldman. supra note 86, at 374-76 (suggesting a list of reforms including
strengthening the obviousness requirement and mandating transparency); Feldman, supra
note 166, at 640-43 (proposing a one-and-done system for patent protection); Feldman, supra
note 176, at 33-34, 41 (proposing that formularies should reflect list price to eliminate the
incentive for anticompetitive rebates); Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 178.
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in detail allow weak patent claims to slide through!"" The burden
of having to overturn an existing patent, let alone a group of
existing patents, provides a powerful deterrent to competition. That
is particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry because even
obviously bogus patent claims stop the generic from entering the
market for thirty months while the case gets litigated.'96
As with many of the reforms discussed in this Article, the tools
already exist within the patent laws as written. Many weak follow·
on patents could be eliminated with an appropriate application of
the obviousness requirement. 297 Many of the strategic behaviors are
grounded in making minimal alterations of existing innovation,
alterations that should be perfectly obvious under patent law.' 98
Similarly, the sleepy and rarely used doctrinal requirement that a
patent be "useful" could be used to ensure that patents are not
simply gumming up the system299 and serving to deter competition
without ''promot[ing] the Progress of ... [the] useful Arts,'' as the
Constitution requires. 30°Courts and agencies have lost their way in
applying those laws, however, taking such narrow approaches that
it is all too easy to obtain and enforce patents on well-understood
computer ideas or on trivial extensions of a drug whose basic patent
has expired."01
Finally, a word of caution. Allowing overall scheme cases will
result in less certainty for defendants, who can no longer count on
immunity for engaging in a particular act. There is a reasonable
295. See Lemley, supra note 179, at 1495-96, 1508.
296. See id. at 1529-30.
297. See Feldman, supra note 86, at 374-76.
298. See, e.g., Mark A Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369,
1393-94 (2017).
299. See Robin C. Feldman, David A. Hyman, W. Nicholson Price II & Mark J. Ratain,
Negative Innovation: When Patents Are Bad for Patients, 39 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 914,
914-16 (2021); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Drugs, Patents, cmd Well-Being,
98 WASH. U. L. REv. 1403, 1408-12 (2021); Michael Riech, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement,
19 GEO. MAsON L. REV. 57 (2011); see also W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty 120
COLUM. L. REV. 769 (2020).
300. See U.S. CoNBT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
301. For an argument that the USPTO should focus more attention on pharmaceutical
follow-on patents, see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Investing in Ex Ante
Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27579, 2020), https:l/www.nber.org/systemlfiles/working_papers/w27579/
w27579.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTX2-SN88].
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worry that this uncertainty might deter legitimate procompetitive
behavior. So we would limit this more holistic approach to conduct
by monopolists or those with a dangerous probability of acquiring
market power, whom we affirmatively want to be more cautious in
restricting competition. And we would require evidence that the
conduct in question was in fact part of a conscious scheme to monopolize a market.
D. Remedies for Anticompetitive Conduct

Finally, once they have found an antitrust violation, courts and
agencies should be permitted to impose remedies that go well
beyond simply stopping the offending conduct. 302 Ordering a company to cease violating the antitrust laws is all well and good, but
it is like closing the barn door after the horse is gone. Years of
engaging in anticompetitive conduct frequently entrenches the
defendant in a market position to which it had no legal right.
Telling it to stop monopolizing after it has already acquired a
monopoly may be better than nothing, but it isn't likely to undo the
long-term effects of the antitrust violation, let alone serve as an
effective deterrent.
Once again antitrust history can lead the way. Nothing in
antitrust or remedies law explicitly limits the power of courts and
agencies to impose structural or behavioral remedies to undo
competitive harm, even if the remedies are directed at things that
weren't themselves antitrust violations. For decades, courts and
agencies were willing to break up monopolies and trusts, order
compulsory licensing of patents, and, until recently, require defendants to disgorge their profits in order to try to restore competition
to a market. 303 Those remedies were important to opening markets
to competition. We should encourage courts and agencies to be more
creative in using remedies that actually undo the harm an antitrust
violation has caused.
302. For discussion of the scope of antitrust remedies, see, for example, A. Douglas

Melamed, The Purposes of Antitrust Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 359, 359-64 (2009).
303. See, e.g., Rory Van Loa, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a "Radical" Remedy,
105 CORNELL L. REV. 1955 (2020) (discussing and defendiog breakups); F.M. SCHERER, THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT IJCENSING (1977).

2022]

ATOMISTIC ANTITRUST

1935

In 2021, the Supreme Court took away the FTC's long-held power
to seek equitable monetary relief alongside injunctions. 304 Despite
decades of the FTC's exercising the power, the Court held that the
FTC Act did not authorize the Commission to pursue such
remedies. 305
AMG Capital's impact is already suppressing antitrust enforcement. InAbb Vie, Inc. v. FTC, for example, the Third Circuit rightly
held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should not shield a company from liability for "sham litigation" even in the absence of an
intent to harm or interfere with a competitor.••• Yet, the FTC
withdrew its litigation shortly after AMG Capital effectively affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the FTC's near-500 million
dollar award. 307 Congress should act quickly to restore the power to
seek the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits, and courts should be
willing to award such relief. The power to order a stop to anticompetitive acts is significantly weakened if the defendants get to keep
all the profits they made.
There are other ways the agencies can use existing law to
strengthen antitrust remedies. The federal/state government case
pending against Facebook right now is based, among other things,
on the allegedly anticompetitive effects of Facebook's acquisition of
Instagram and WhatsApp over the past decade. 308 FTC v. Facebook
presents a possibility that courts have rarely directly confronted in
at least twenty years 309 : that a court may be asked to break up an
existing company in order to try to restore competition."'" We don't
take a position on whether Facebook should be broken up. But we
304. AMG Capital Mgm't, LLC. v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021).
305. ld.
306. 976 F.3d 327, 361 (3d Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. AbbVie Inc. v. FTC, 141 S. Ct.
2838 (2021).
307. AbbVie Inc., et al., FED. TRADE CoMM'N (July 30, 2021), https:/lwww.ftc.gov/enforce
ment/cases-proceedings/121·0028/abbvie-inc-et-al [https://perma.ccND7B-3NY2].
308. First Amended Complaint at 78-79, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C.
2021).
309. The court considered but rejected the possibility of breaking up Microsoft when it was
found to violate the antitrust laws in 2001. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (en bane).
310. After this paper was written, the Fourth Circuit upheld the breakup of an existing
company after finding that the merger violated the antitrust laws. Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JeldWen, Inc., 988 F.3d 690 (4th Cir. 2021). The merger was not blocked in advance, and the suit
was only brought by a private party years later.
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think courts should not shy away from breaking up a monopolist
after finding that it has violated the antitrust laws. It is likely to
present some tough challenges, 311 but there may be no other way to
genuinely eliminate a monopoly and restore competition.
CONCLUSION

The antitrust laws on the books are remarkably flexible and
forward-looking. They provide both the background theory and the
necessary tools to handle a myriad of problems that are hampering
competition more than a century after the original laws were
codified. It is a tribute to the wisdom of the original drafters that
antitrust law embodies such prophetic power. And in the past,
courts and the agencies used that flexibility.
That power, however, lies dormant. Modern antitrust law has
become increasingly atomistic, with courts and agencies alike
focusing on individual points of behavior, rather than considering
the comprehensive competitive effects of business behavior. That
atomistic approach leaves antitrust law ill-equipped to handle
behaviors involving probabilistic competitive harm-that is, multiple acts, any one of which might or might not cause competitive
harm-and synergistic competitive harm-that is, acts that are
lawful when taken individually but combine together in an anticompetitive manner. As a result, modern antitrust leaves a large
swath of anticompetitive behaviors unattended, including large
tech companies buying startups, employers imposing noncompete
clauses, pharmaceutical company behaviors blocking generics, and
patent aggregators asserting large portfolios. Across a wide range
of conduct, antitrust authorities simply miss the forest for the trees.
The antitrust laws as written can handle these types of troubling
behaviors if properly applied. But we can improve the way those
laws are implemented. Along these lines, we recommend creating a
presumption of anticompetitive harm from acquisitions by firms
with a certain level of market share, because some industry players
are simply too big to buy. We also recommend a series of other
311. E.g., Stephen D. Houck, Breaking up Is Hard to Do (Sept. 20, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457348 [https-1/perma.cc/
26QB-R6ZH]. But see VanLoo, supra note 303.
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changes that will help courts and agencies focus not just on
individual or proven harms but on probabilistic reductions of
competition and anticompetitive synergies.
One does not need legislation for the recommendations we have
outlined. Courts and agencies may have gone so far down the
atomistic pathway, however, that clarification of these issues by
Congress could provide an important boost. Nevertheless, whether
legislatively or judicially, antitrust law must turn its attention to
the forest rather than the trees.

